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The essays in this dissertation explore why female landowners may be less likely than
male landowners to achieve long term conservation on their land.
In Chapter 1 we develop theory to model the strategic interaction between a landowner
and a tenant with a focus on their gender and implementation of conservation practices on
land. Within the context of a sequential-move game, we use the principal-agent
framework and identity theory to model land-use choice and equilibrium payoffs between
landowner and tenant. We consider cash rent lease and discounted lease whereby the
tenant pays a reduced rent if they implement conservation practices on the leased land.
Our model predicts that for tenants with low valuation for the environment, prescription
within a rental contract yields social identity losses that overwhelm their benefits from
conservation, leading them to ignore the female landowner’s request. Therefore, the
landowner must give rental discounts to the tenant to incentivize conservation. In a
similar situation, male landowners can prescribe in a traditional rental set up as they

undergo no social identity losses. This outcome suggests that ecosystem services benefits
may be underprovided due to gender norms.
In the second essay we adapt the model from Chapter 1 to design an experiment that
analyzes the tenant’s choice to conserve under three types of leasing agreements - fixed
rent, fixed rent with penalty and with discount, when gender of the landowners and
identity norms are salient. We then use the analysis to design a controlled lab experiment
in which we vary the gender of the landowner, communication opportunities and gender
priming conditions. Findings indicate that male tenants do choose to conserve more for
male landowners compared to female landowners. However, our conjecture about women
offering more discounted rental contracts does not hold. Compared to male landowners,
women landowners chose to offer more fixed rent contracts that had neither penalty nor
discount to the male tenants. Moreover, we find that male landowners offered higher
discounts than women.
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This work is dedicated to my mother Dr Nupur Dey, who taught me that hard work and
persistence are two miraculous behavioral interventions, always accessible to me
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Chapter 1
Role of Gender in Conservation Outcomes on Leased Farmland –
Theoretical Analysis
1.1 Introduction
Farmland can provide a wealth of ecosystem services, such as protection of biodiversity,
and habitat for wildlife, via adoption of conservation-friendly land use practices.
However, the adoption of conservation practices on agricultural land may depend on
whether the farmer owns the land or not; There is evidence that conservation practices are
less likely to be implemented on rented land. Ranjan et al. (2019) find that when
farmland is leased, landowners and tenants face challenges in collaboratively planning
conservation practices. Insecurity regarding land tenure have impacted site specific
conservation practices such as planting of cover crops (Deaton et al., 2018), straw
retention (Gao et al., 2018) buffer strips and sediment basins(Sawadgo et al., 2021).
Rental arrangements between the landowner and the tenant may disincentivize adoption
of conservation practices due to a misalignment between the renter’s and the landowner’s
interests. While a landowner has more incentives for undertaking conservation practices
on their own land, for a renter the decision to conserve depends on the length of the lease,
the costs of undertaking conservation and the returns generated from conservation. For
example, conservation tillage can increase profits in the short term due to costs saved but
long-term practices such as strip cropping, contour farming etc. may generate returns
over several years. (Soule et al., 2000)

2

The Tenure, Ownership and Transition of Agricultural Land (TOTAL) survey issued by
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 2014 states that more than half
of US farmland is leased out, suggesting that conservation practices may be adopted at a
lower rate on a substantial proportion of US farmland. The TOTAL survey also estimates
that while the tenant group is predominantly male, the percentage of women landowners
has been increasing over time. Women are becoming landowners by inheriting land or by
taking over management of land co-owned with their spouse when their spouse passes
away. Even though female landowners may have higher levels of environmental concerns
and exhibit stronger environmental attitudes than men (Carolan 2005, Druschke & Secchi
2014, Petrzelka et al. 2018), they often face difficulties when mandating their male
tenants to implement conservation practices on their land (Petrzelka et al., 2018) as such
direct prescription amounts to them violating the dominant social norm within the
farming community of not “managing” their male tenant (Carter, 2019). Conservation
requests of most women landowners are disregarded by their male tenants (Wells and
Eells, 2011). Therefore, a desire to pursue environmental conservation on female
landowners’ land leads to conflict between their gender identity (conforming to the
gendered norm of not prescribing conservation to their male tenants) and their
environmental preferences as landowners interested in preserving ecosystem services of
their land. The choices a female landowner faces as the landowner is constrained by the
internalized social norms of being a female in a setting that has maintained traditional
gender expectations.

1

Female landowners are constrained by social norms in two ways – 1) when they seek information on
farmland management and 2) when they implement land management changes. This distinction was
explored by Cater (2019) in her qualitative analysis of interviews of women NOLs in Iowa.

1
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Economic literature has used contract theory in explaining incentive structures that would
ensure an efficient bargaining outcome between a principal and an agent, in our case the
landowner and the tenant. Apart from incentives, the social framework that incorporates
social norms and an individual’s identity is worth preserving in an economic framework
as it directly impacts conservation outcomes in our context. Identities and norms have
become more relevant in landowner-tenant relationship as more women become
managing landowners. The conflict between an individual’s identity and social norms in
an economic framework was first brought up by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Akerlof
and Kranton (2000) showed that who the decision-maker thinks she is (her identity) and
what she and others around her thinks she should do (her norms) are equally important in
determining decisions made in an economic setting. Collier(2016) further distinguishes
between identity, social narratives, and norms in an economic framework. Identity
influences preferences of an individual, social narratives help an individual understand
causality behind her decisions and their social consequences and norms refer to the social
constraints the individual has internalized (Collier, 2016). One way of going about
solving the conflict of identities and norms, as Collier (2016) suggests, is when principals
can implement a new identity, a new norm or disseminate norms in the unit of which they
are in charge. There are organizations cropping up in agriculture that are trying to start a
new narrative in this way – for example, FarmHer 2 started a photo project of capturing
women working on the farm to update the image of agriculture. However, at an
individual level, what happens when the principals themselves face identity related
issues?

2

https://farmher.com/
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Examining conservation outcomes based on gender of the landowner is an underresearched but critically important issue given the environmental implications of
landowner-tenant negotiation. This paper focuses on the challenge of implementing
conservation practices on agricultural farmland through a simple analytical framework
that centers on the interaction between the landowner and the tenant. The framework
incorporates the economic incentives for decision-making for a principal and an agent
and the social norms that the economic actors consider while deciding on conservation
outcomes in a leasing set up. This model allows us to test how economic incentives
interact with norms and identities to arrive at a desired outcome of preserving rented
farmland.
We have four possible cases of gendered interactions – Female Landowner- Male Tenant,
Female Landowner-Female Tenant, Male Landowner- Male Tenant and Male Landowner
– Female Tenant. We explore all cases for completeness and to cover demographic
scenarios that may arise in the future.

We use identity theory and the principal-agent framework to model the leasing agreement
between the two parties and subsequent land use choice and Nash equilibrium payoffs
within the context of a sequential move game. We consider two types of leases – the
traditional cash rent lease, which involves paying a fixed amount as rent every leasing
period, and a discounted lease which has been promoted by university extension whereby
the tenant pays a reduced rent if they implement conservation practices on leased land
(Cox, 2010). These cash rent and discounted leases confer pecuniary benefits for both the
landowner and tenant. Additionally, both male and female landowners can receive
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nonpecuniary environmental benefits when conservation practices are put in place. When
offering the fixed rental or discounted contract to the tenant, the landowner has the option
to prescribe that the tenant implement conservation practices on the land. Following
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), when a female landowner prescribes to a male tenant there
is a non-pecuniary social identity loss for the female landowner. At the same time, the
male tenant may also suffer identity losses if he chooses to follow his female landowner’s
prescription within a traditional leasing framework. Under a discounted lease setting,
such social identity losses are offset as the female landowner financially compensates her
male tenant. On the other hand, when the male tenant chooses not to follow the
landowner’s prescription (regardless of the landowner’s gender) in a fixed rental contract,
there is a chance that the landowner does not renew the tenant’s contract in the future.
We explore literature that shows how financial transactions can reduce or eliminate the
impacts of social norms in section 1.3.1.

Our model integrates economic payoffs and the behavioral tension in the landownertenant interaction to highlight cases when identity and contract structure impact
conservation on farmland. Between a female landowner and a male tenant, conservation
gets impacted when the tenant weighs the social identity losses from following
prescriptions from a female landowner as greater than the economic losses from not
following prescriptions. Given perfect information and anticipating this tension our
model predictions follow. The female landowner weighs her cost of offering a discount
against the benefits of conservation practices she wants undertaken on her land. If the
discount is more costly than the benefits, she will offer a fixed rental contract with
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prescription and the tenant will ignore the prescription. If the discount is less costly than
the benefits, she would either offer a discount or choose not to prescribe due to identity
loss and have underinvestment in conservation on her land. In the case of other gendered
interactions such as a male landowner and male tenant, the tenant would only have to
consider the losses he could experience if he did not follow prescriptions of his male
landowner. In the case where the male tenant does not follow prescriptions and the male
landowner also does not want to undergo the cost of offering a discounted leasing
contract, there would be under-investment in conservation, although male landowners are
not inhibited by identity losses like female landowners, to prescribe conservation in a
fixed rental contract.
1.2 Gender and Conservation of Leased Land
The role of women landowners in the context of making decisions about the land they
own, has been evolving over time. Carter (2017) analyzes qualitative interviews of
women landowners and finds that social norms tend to make women landowners assume
the “placeholder” position. As placeholders women are required to maintain pre-existing
land agreements with tenants and co-owners and defer to the tenants for making
decisions. Some women resist the gendered expectations of such norms and being a
placeholder. Carter(2017) calls them “changemakers” and goes on to document the
backlash and resistance they faced when they tried to implement conservation on the land
and change the way things have been done before them. The backlash from trying to
implement change on the land has been documented in many other studies as well. A
common theme that has emerged through surveys of women landowners across the US—
including Iowa, North Dakota, Minnesota, Connecticut, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia and
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Indiana—is that women landowners feel like outsiders in their own communities
(Carolan 2005, Petrzelka et al. 2018, Carter 2019). They are alienated from the existing
male-dominated networks of information. Such alienation is further intensified when they
want to implement conservation on the land they lease as that violates traditional genderrelated social norms in the community.
Carter (2019) finds women landowners do want to take the initiative to learn more about
newer conservation methods. However, they hesitate to access local United States
Department of Agriculture offices for more information. The reluctance comes from a
fear that their actions might be interpreted as distrust towards their tenant, which could
strain their relationship with the tenant. 3 Moreover, some women landowners have
reported that they face severe social backlash when, against their tenants’ suggestions,
they choose to prioritize conservation. For example, one woman reported being
ostracized in her community for refusing to allow her tenant to convert wetlands to grow
more crops, while another woman faced criticism for choosing to enroll her land in the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) instead of growing crops on it (Carter, 2019).In a
more recent study looking into undergraduate students’ perceptions of landowner tenant
relationships in conservation decisions Basche and Carter(2020) find that students(many
of whom plan to enter the agricultural workforce) returned to gendered norms when
making management plans for female landowners, despite learning about the importance
of conservation on rented land. They devalued the female landowner’s goals calling them
“unrealistic” or “not feasible”.

Petrzelka (2018) finds that even when women landowners call Farm Service Agency offices to get
information about their land, they are asked to come in and show their marriage certificate to prove that
they in fact own the land.

3
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1.3 Model
In Section 1.3.1, we provide background on the economic and behavioral literature we
use to set up the strategic framework describing the interaction between landowner and
tenant. Section 1.3.2 describes the strategic setting of the interaction between the
landowner and tenant along with the payoff functions. The theoretical analysis
incorporates aspects of identity and norms that the principal and an agent face within the
context of a sequential-move game. We use identity theory and the principal-agent
framework to model the leasing agreement between the two parties and subsequent land
use choice and Nash equilibrium payoffs. We assume that there is complete information
between landowners and tenants. This enables us to construct a model that predicts
conservation outcomes based on the gender of the landowner. We use backward
induction to obtain the Nash Equilibrium solutions of the game. Section 1.4 shows a
numerical illustration of the set up. Section 1.5 concludes this chapter.
1.3.1 Background
For contracts in which an agent is engaged to perform multiple tasks for a principal, the
agent puts in more effort on the task that is easily measurable and for which he/she is
directly incentivized (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). In a production situation in which
quantity is more easily measurable than quality and the incentive structure tends to be
oriented towards quantity – for example, a worker is either paid a fixed wage per hour or
is paid a piece rate based on the quantity of items he/she produces. The principal sees
quality and quantity as complementary to each other whereas the agent sees them as
substitutes due to the nature of the contract – putting more effort towards quality
increases the cost of producing more quantity due to the opportunity costs of time. The
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aspect of the task that is not directly incentivized gets ignored by the agent. This issue is
addressed in contract theory as the problem of designing an optimum multitask incentive
mechanism.
Akerlof (1982) approached the problem of optimum incentives for a multitask
environment using Gift Exchange Theory. The theory explains why firms set a wage
higher than the market clearing wage, making the contract look like a “gift”. A high wage
prompts the worker to reciprocate by doing work in excess of the minimum work
standard and therefore put in effort in both contractible and non-contractible tasks.
A similar explanation is given by Fehr and Schmidt (2004) who use economic
experiments to compare a contract that offers a bonus to a piece rate contract. The study
finds that when given an option between offering a piece rate contract and a bonus
contract, principals tend to offer bonus contracts more often than the piece rate ones.
Agents reciprocate by putting in higher effort for the non-contractible task when the
bonus is offered. In a piece rate setting, agents only focus on the task they are being
incentivized on.
In the agricultural context, the misalignment between landowners’ and tenant’s objectives
occurs because under traditional leasing arrangements—typically cash rent or
sharecropping—the tenant does not get incentivized directly to carry out conservation
practices on land. This is because it may be difficult for landowners to ensure agents
follow through with conservation especially if they are absentee landowners or lack
knowledge on what would be the best practice for the land. These factors prevent
landowners from putting in specific clauses in the contract. Ranjan et al. (2019) also
highlight that many landowners do not want to bring up conservation issues with their
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tenants as that may put their relationship with their tenant at risk. Thus, this situation is
like the problem of finding an optimum multitask incentive mechanism. Any
conservation practice that the tenant might adopt is largely self-motivated, owing to
wanting to preserve a good relationship with the landowner or driven by pecuniary
motivations such as obtaining market returns from selling cover crops. This is likely to
result in under provision of environmental benefits from conservation activities.
In our model, the landowner can choose between offering two types of leases – the
traditional cash rent lease, which involves paying a fixed amount as rent every leasing
period, and the discounted rental lease. There are two objectives behind introducing a
discount into the modeling framework. First, a discounted rent in the landowner-tenant
context acts like a bonus arrangement between a principal and an agent that incentivizes
investment by the agent in the production of quality, thus serving as an optimal multi-task
incentive mechanism. A discounted lease has been promoted by university extension
whereby the tenant pays a reduced rent if they implement conservation practices on
leased land (Cox, 2010). These cash rent and discounted leases confer pecuniary benefits
for both the landowner and tenant. The landowner receives nonpecuniary environmental
benefits when conservation practices are put in place as the quality of the land is
preserved and the land provides ecosystem service benefits, apart from the direct payoffs
from earning rent. The tenant is less likely to receive these nonpecuniary benefits from
implementing conservation practices in the same way that their landowner does since
tenants do not have access to the environmental benefits of the land after the lease ends.
The second objective of introducing the discount incentive is to examine how the
discount interacts with the gender identity norms in a principal agent framework. Collier
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(2016) points out that material incentives can act as both complements or substitutes to
existing norms. Belsey et al. (2014) find that material incentive of a penalty for tax
evasion works as a complement to the norm that not paying one’s taxes is immoral. On
the other hand, the material incentive of charging a penalty for being late to pick up one’s
child from day care acted as a substitute to the norm of showing up on time to not cause
discomfort to the day care staff. Instead of seeing the penalty as a token of this
discomfort parents felt better about coming late to pick up their children late as they were
paying for the discomfort caused (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000).
In the same way, we can examine discount as an incentive that may be used more by
female landowners to dissipate discomfort of going against the norms and providing
conservation prescriptions to a male tenant. The discount may switch the parties’
perception of the conservation activity from a social to a financial transaction and thus
lessen identity losses.
In the model we set up in the next section, we therefore examine a landowner’s choice
between two contracts – a discounted contract and a traditional cash rental contract
without discount and subsequent decisions made by the tenant. We do not consider sharecropping contracts because a cash rental agreement is more common among landowners
according to the TOTAL survey 70% of respondents in the survey use fixed cash rent
arrangements with their tenant.
1.3.2 Theoretical Analysis
We apply the principal-agent framework used in the multi-task incentive literature in the
context of the agricultural landowner and tenant farmer interaction, where the landowner
is the principal, and the tenant is the agent. In this set up, both landowners and tenants
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can be male or female. The rental market is competitive and there is common knowledge
about the nature of the rental market.
The landowner chooses between a traditional and a discounted rental contract, in which
he/she offers a discount to the tenant to incentivize him/her to take up conservation
practices while farming. Additionally, we assume that the discount offered is enough to
offset the conservation costs of the tenant, thereby implying full compliance in a fixed
rent with discount contract. This discount is not paid if the conservation effort is less than
the optimum conservation effort level.
The tenant exerts production effort 𝑒𝑒1 > 0 and conservation effort 𝑒𝑒2 ≥ 0 . The

landowner does not include 𝑒𝑒2 effort level directly in the traditional rental contract, as
Ranjan et al. (2019) observed. However, when offering the traditional contract, the
landowner can prescribe that the tenant put in high conservation effort.
We assume an identical distribution of valuation of the environment across male and
female landowners. We depict this environmental valuation of the landowner through the
benefit component 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 ), which is a function of the tenant’s level of conservation effort

𝑒𝑒2 . Although literature indicates that female landowners exhibited stronger pro

environmental attitudes than men, we use this simplifying assumption that male and
female landowner have same environmental preferences to focus on the gendered aspects
of their lease choice and the tenant’s action choice.
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The landowner’s utility function is:

Where:

𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑑𝑑, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅 − 𝑑𝑑] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) − [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]

R is the fixed rent charged to the tenant
d≥ 0 is the discount offered in the discounted contract

𝐿𝐿1 is the marginal utility coefficient from the monetary gains of receiving the rent from
the tenant.

𝑒𝑒2 is the level of conservation effort the tenant invests.

𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) is the landowner’s environmental gains from the tenant implementing the

prescribed level of 𝑒𝑒2 on the land. Implicit here is the assumption that the landowner does
not make environmental value gains when the tenant chooses a level 𝑒𝑒2 less than 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 .

This assumption helps us to emphasize the core friction between the landowner and

tenant relationship when it comes to conservation, i.e., landowner wants the tenant to
conserve at a certain level and the tenant does not have a clear incentive to do so. By not
examining environmental value gains that landowner makes from the under optimal level
of conservation (which would be less than 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) anyway), we can focus on the main

issue of under-investment in optimum conservation effort level and consequent sub game
perfect Nash equilibria based on the gender of the landowner.
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 is the identity loss of the landowner, which is a function of the gender (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 ) of the

landowner and whether the landowner chooses to prescribe conservation effort to the
tenant.
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𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) = �

>0
=0

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

Note that in our model, female landowners experiences the identity loss when prescribing
irrespective of whether male tenants comply with their request.
The tenant’s utility function is:
𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 �𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝑅𝑅, 𝑑𝑑, 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅 , 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )�
Where:

= 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2 ) + 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] − [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]

Production function: 𝑓𝑓(𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 ) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2 ) where A is a constant and 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1)

captures the extent to which the conservation effort 𝑒𝑒2 confers productive benefits to the

tenant. If conservation effort mostly provides public environmental benefits that do not
impact agricultural productivity, 𝛾𝛾 is closer to 0.

Cost function: 𝐶𝐶(𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 ) = 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 + 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2 and 𝐵𝐵2 > 𝐵𝐵1 . The tenants do not have an

incentive to invest in conservation measures of the land because they are renting. Access
to land for the tenants depend on the length of the contract. If their contract is not
renewed the benefits of investing in conservation practices would be lost to the tenant.
𝑇𝑇1 is the marginal utility coefficient from the monetary gains from carrying out
production on the land

𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 is the loss the tenant may experience when the landowner does not renew the contract
because the tenant didn’t follow the landowner’s prescription in a fixed rental contract.
Ranjan et al. (2019) point out that as the rental market is competitive the tenant would
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not want to put their reputation at risk by not following prescriptions.𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ≥ 0 only when

the landowner prescribes to the tenant in a fixed rent contract and the tenant does
not follow through.

𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 is the identity loss of the tenant, which is a function of the gender of the landowner
𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 and whether the tenant chooses to follow the prescription of 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 from the female
landowner. 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 >0 only for a female landowner, male tenant interaction and zero
otherwise.

1.3.2.1 Male Tenant’s Strategies and Payoffs with a Female Landowner

Figure 1.1 Decision tree of female landowner and male tenant’s interaction

Figure 1.1 shows the decision tree of the payoffs from the female landowner and the male
tenant’s interaction. The landowner can either choose to prescribe high conservation
effort under a discounted contract (P, DR); prescribe high effort under a traditional
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contract (P,R); or not prescribe and offer a traditional rental contract (NP,R). 4 We will
now enumerate different scenarios of Nash equilibria possible between a female
landowner and male tenant and then summarize the sub game perfect equilibrium strategy
and payoffs.
When discounted rent is offered to the tenant from a female landowner and the tenant
chooses to follow the prescription he earns:
𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇P = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2P ) + 𝑑𝑑 − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2P ] ….(1)

If he doesn’t follow the prescription he earns:

𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2 ) − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2 ]. . . . .. (2)

(i) If the discount offsets the net cost of implementing 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 , that is, 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇P > 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 , the
tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃

(ii) If the discount does not offset the conservation effort cost 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇P < 𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 , the tenant
puts in 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃

Based on our discussion above on exploring discounts as an incentive to offset
discomfort of going against social norms, we assume that the discount is an optimal one
such that it offsets the cost of investing in 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 for the tenant.

When a fixed rental contract with prescription is offered to the tenant and he chooses
to follow the prescription he earns:

4

Since the discounted rental contract always involves the prescription of high conservation effort, under
this setting the landowner always prescribes high effort.
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𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 �𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝑅𝑅, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )� = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ] −

[𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]…………………….(3)

Where [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] > 0 since the female landowner prescribes, and the male tenant

follows the prescription.

If the tenant chooses not to follow the prescription he earns:
𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 �𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝑅𝑅, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )� = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2 ) − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] … … … … ..(4)

Following figure 1, the tenant needs to weigh his costs and benefits from putting in
𝑒𝑒2 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 when prescribed by the landowner with a fixed rental contract.

Subtracting Equation 4 from Equation 3 we get the following outcome for the male
tenant:
(iii) 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 − 𝑒𝑒2 ) − 𝐵𝐵2 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 − 𝑒𝑒2 )] > [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] - the tenant chooses to
follow 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃

Scenario 1: Expression (iii) shows that for the tenant to put in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 , the loss from

not following the requirements of the contractual relationship and having the contract not
renewed and the returns of conservation effort[𝝅𝝅𝑻𝑻 = (𝑻𝑻𝟏𝟏 [𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨(𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 ) −

𝑩𝑩𝟐𝟐 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 − 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 )])] should be greater than the identity loss of the tenant.

(iv) If 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] + 𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 < [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )], the tenant chooses to follow 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃

Scenario 2: In expression (iv), identity loss is more than the loss from not following the
principal’s prescriptions and the economic returns of conservation. This kind of behavior

18

is also termed in psychology as “reactance” (Collier, 2016) where faced with the
prescription, the tenant tries to regain autonomy by non-compliance.
When the fixed rental contract without prescription is offered to the tenant and he
chooses to put in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 he earns:

𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 �𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝑅𝑅, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )� = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ]……(5)

If the tenant chooses an 𝑒𝑒2 such that 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 he earns:

𝑈𝑈𝑇𝑇 �𝑒𝑒1 , 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝑅𝑅, 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )� = 𝑇𝑇1 [𝐴𝐴(𝑒𝑒1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑒𝑒2 ) − 𝑅𝑅 − 𝐵𝐵1 𝑒𝑒1 − 𝐵𝐵2 𝑒𝑒2 ]……(6)

The tenant earns less from putting in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 and would therefore always choose to put
in 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 when offered a fixed rental contract without prescription of conservation
effort.

The strategy choice for the tenant therefore depends on two factors: i) type of contract ii)
the relative magnitude of the two types of losses a tenant can face: 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) or 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿

Below we summarize the main strategies the tenant adopts given a lease choice:
Strategy 1 :When a discounted contract is offered to the tenant, the tenant is

compensated for the conservation practices, and he always puts in the prescribed effort
level 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 .

Strategy 2: When the tenant is offered a fixed rental contract with prescription, he will
put in the prescribed effort level if 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 > [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]. In case of a fixed rental

contract with no prescription, the tenant never puts in 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 .
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1.3.2.2 Female Landowner’s Payoff and Strategy
When the landowner offers a discounted rental contract, and the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃
she earns

𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑑𝑑, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅 − 𝑑𝑑] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )……(7)

If the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 , the discount is not paid, and she earns
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑑𝑑, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅]…….(8)

When the landowner offers a fixed rental contract with prescription and the tenant
follows this prescription, she earns:
𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) − [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]…….(9)
If the tenant does not follow this prescription, she earns:

𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] − [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]………(10)

Where [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] > 0 only when a female landowner chooses to prescribe. This loss in
identity is realized owing to violation of the social norm that the female landowner

should not prescribe any action to her male tenant. This loss is absent when a discount is
provided.
When the landowner offers a fixed rental contract without prescription and the male
tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 , the landowner earns:

𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )…….(11)
When the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 the landowner earns:
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𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿 �𝑅𝑅, 𝑒𝑒2 , 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ), 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2 )� = 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅]………(12)

Since the landowner’s payoffs depend on what the tenant does, we examine all possible
combinations of the tenant’s actions under different contract choices offered to him to
arrive at the Sub game Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE).
1.3.2.3 SPNEs for Female Landowner and Male tenant
Male tenant does not display reactance:
The tenant weighs the losses of not following the prescription of the landowner and the
economic losses from the one-time conservation effort more than the losses of his
identity as a male tenant. The female landowner would therefore compare her payoffs
from offering a discounted rental contract- 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅 − 𝑑𝑑] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) and fixed rent contract

with prescription (𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) − [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )]) and without prescription (𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅]). It
is optimal for the landowner to offer a fixed rent contract with prescription only when
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) < 𝑑𝑑. Therefore the Nash equilibrium are formulated as follows.
Case I. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 > [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] , 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 0, 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) < 𝑑𝑑

The Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium is

𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳𝑭𝑭 = { 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷, 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 }

Case II. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 > [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] , 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 0, 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 𝑑𝑑

In this case it is optimal for the female landowner to offer a discount rather than undergo
identity losses from prescription
The Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium is
𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳𝑭𝑭 = { 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 }
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Male tenant displays reactance :
Case III. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 < [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] , 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 𝐿𝐿1 𝑑𝑑

Tenant displays reactance and does not follow prescription of the female landowner. This
behavior is usually what has been documented in surveys conducted with women
landowners. The landowner earns 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅 − 𝑑𝑑] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) from the discounted contract,

𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] − [𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] from the fixed rent contract with prescription and 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] from fixed

rental contract with no prescription. If 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 𝐿𝐿1 𝑑𝑑 for the female landowner, she will
offer a discounted contract to the tenant to ensure that 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃
The Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium is

𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳𝑭𝑭 = {𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹 𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂
𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 } 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 ) > 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅

Case IV. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 < [𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺, 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )] , 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) < 𝐿𝐿1 𝑑𝑑

In this case, the female landowner does not offer the discounted contract as the discount
is more costly than the environmental value she gains from the land.
In this case, it is optimal for the female landowner not to offer a discounted rental
contract to ensure that 𝑒𝑒2 = 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃

The Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium is
𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳𝑭𝑭 = {𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷, 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹}𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂
𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻𝑴𝑴 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 < 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 } 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 ) < 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅
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Figure 1.2 Decision tree of all gendered interactions other than female landowner and
male tenant
1.3.2.4 Male-Female, Male-Male and Female-Female Interactions
All other gendered interactions between landowner and tenant do not require the
landowner or the tenant to undergo social identity losses due to gender. We formulate our
theory along these lines because Akerlof and Kranton(2000) pointed out that identity loss
occurs only when participants go against social prescriptions of their social category
(gender in our case). This identity loss manifests because female landowners assume a
responsibility(of renting out land and ensuring optimum conservation) that has been
predominantly male dominated.
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By the same reasoning, a male landowner would not be going against social prescriptions
of being male in a rural setting if he offers a fixed rent with prescription contract.
Similarly, a male tenant or female tenant do not face an identity loss when following his
prescription. When it comes to female landowner- female tenant interactions, they are
both aware of the social prescriptions of their gender. However, both are stepping into
responsibilities that have been male dominated. In this case, if the female tenant thinks
like a male tenant and expects her female landowner to follow social prescriptions
pertaining to gender, then we will expect the same Nash equilibrium outcomes predicted
for a female landowner, male tenant scenario. Otherwise, the female landowner and the
female tenant would not experience any identity losses as they both belong to the same
social category. For the purposes of testing in an experimental setting and comparing
outcomes we focus on the male landowner and male tenant scenario.
Figure 2 shows the decision tree for the gendered interactions other than the female
landowner and male tenant dyad.
1.3.2.5 SPNEs for Male-Female, Male-Male and Female-Female interactions
Case I. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 > 0, 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 0

If the net economic returns from conservation after accounting for loss is positive, the
tenant will follow the prescription of the landowner. The landowner would compare
his/her payoffs from fixed rent without prescription, fixed rent with prescription, and rent
with discount and prescription. He/she gains the most from fixed rent with prescription.
The Sub Game Perfect Nash Equilibrium is
𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 = { 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷, 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 }
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Case II. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 < 0, 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) > 𝐿𝐿1 𝑑𝑑

If the tenant does not attach importance to the breakdown of the relationship from not
following prescriptions and only wants to maximize his/her immediate profits, they will
not follow the prescription of the landowner in a fixed rental setting. The landowner
earns 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅 − 𝑑𝑑] + 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) from offering the discounted contract and 𝐿𝐿1 [𝑅𝑅] from the

fixed rental set up. If the environmental gains of the landowner exceed the discount, the
landowner will offer the discounted contract.
𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 = 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝒕𝒕 𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘𝒘 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂
𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 = 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 } 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 ) > 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅

Case III. 𝑇𝑇1 [𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 ] +𝜋𝜋𝑇𝑇 < 0, 𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 ) < 𝐿𝐿1 𝑑𝑑

Case III accounts for the type of landowners who do not gain from environmental
conservation and the discount is costlier than the gains. Therefore, such landowners
would be indifferent between offering a fixed rental contract with or without prescription
to the tenant.
𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 = {𝑵𝑵𝑵𝑵 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷, 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 < 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 } 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 ) < 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅

𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 = { 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷, 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹} 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝝈𝝈𝑻𝑻 = {𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐 < 𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝑷𝑷 } 𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 𝑽𝑽𝑳𝑳 (𝒆𝒆𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 ) < 𝑳𝑳𝟏𝟏 𝒅𝒅
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1.3.2.6 Comparison between SPNEs of Male and Female landowners with their Male
tenants
The Nash equilibria highlight the economic and behavioral conflicts faced both by the
landowner and the tenant. The landowner faces a conflict between how much they value
conserving their land and the discounted lease that he/she must offer to ensure that the
conservation practices are implemented on their land. The tenants face a conflict between
whether they follow through on the prescription of the landowner when no discount is
offered even though that means earning less from production activities on land but
maintaining the relationship with the landowner so that his/her contract is renewed.
However, when working with a female landowner there is the added issue of
experiencing identity loss from going against gender norms when following prescriptions
issued by a female landowner. Therefore, the tenant may refuse to follow prescriptions of
a female landowner in a fixed rental contract, as seen in case III of section 1.3.2A, more
than they would disobey a male landowner, just based on the fact that there is no identity
loss with a male landowner.
The female landowner’s choices are limited compared to a male landowner if she does
not want to offer a discount to the tenant. She cannot successfully opt for offering a fixed
rental contract with prescription, which a male landowner can choose to do if he chooses
not to offer a discounted contract. A female landowner has two options – she may either
offer a discount and the tenant would put in 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 with certainty or offer a fixed rental
contract with no prescription and be content with 𝑒𝑒2 < 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 .

In the next section, we examine the model with a numerical illustration.
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1.4 Numerical Illustration
We assume the following values for production and conservation efforts in Table 1.1.
The tenant exerts production effort 𝑒𝑒1 > 0 and conservation effort 𝑒𝑒2 > 0 where both

𝑒𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑒2 ∈ [1,2] and 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 = 2. The conservation effort 𝑒𝑒2 assumes positive values as our
model assumes through the production function that the tenant gets some benefits from

conservation. In other words, putting in some level of conservation effort is profitable to
the tenant. For example, conservation tillage is profitable for the tenant due to reduction
of labor and machinery costs (Soule et al., 2000) while other practices may become
profitable over the long term such as strip cropping, grassed waterways, or terracing.
In our model this distinction between short term practices and medium- or long-term
practices is depicted by 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 and 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 = 2 respectively. We are interested to

differentiate between conservation efforts in this way because Soule et al. (2000) point
out that the medium- or long-term conservation practices that generate public
environmental benefits are particularly impacted due to land being rented by the
landowner. In our model, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 represents all short-term practices while 𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 = 2
represents all practices that impact long term land conservation.
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Table 1.1 Parameters assumed for numerical illustration
Variables
Rent (R)
Discount (d)
Production and Conservation Effort (𝑒𝑒1 and 𝑒𝑒2 )
A (production constant)
𝛾𝛾
Prescribed level of Conservation (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )
Cost of production effort when 𝑒𝑒1 = 1
Cost of production effort when 𝑒𝑒1 = 2
cost of conservation effort when e2=1
Cost of conservation effort when e2=2
𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿 (𝑒𝑒2𝑃𝑃 )

Values
$50
$10
1, 2
50
0.5
2
$5
$10
$10
$40
$11

We use a cash rental rate (R) of $50 and a contract discount d of $10 and 𝛾𝛾 = 0.5, Tables
1.2 and 1.3 provide the payoff functions and magnitudes for the landowner and tenant

under each contract type and for different effort levels without the inclusion of loss terms.
Table 1.2 Landowner’s Payoffs
Contract Type

Discounted
Rental Contract
Traditional Rental
Contract

Input Combinations
𝑒𝑒1 = 1,
𝑒𝑒2 = 1

𝑒𝑒1 = 1,
𝑒𝑒2 = 2

𝑒𝑒1 = 2,
𝑒𝑒2 = 2

𝑒𝑒1 = 2,
𝑒𝑒2 = 2

$50

$61

$50

$61

$50

$51

$50

$51
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Table 1.3 Tenant’s Payoffs
Input Combinations

Discounted
Rent
Fixed Rent

𝑒𝑒1 = 1, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1
$10

$10−𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿

𝑒𝑒1 = 1, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2
$15
$5

$55

$55 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿

$60
$50

Following table 1.3, strategies 𝑒𝑒1 = 1, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 and 𝑒𝑒1 = 1, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 are strictly dominated.
Therefore, in the strategic setting we restrict our attention to 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 and 𝑒𝑒1 =

2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 scenarios. 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 > 0 only when the tenant faces a conservation prescription from
the landowner in a fixed rent setting.
1.4.1 Game Solutions
Given our payoff functions in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, we present the extensive form game
representing the strategic setting involving the female landowner and her male tenant in
Figure 1.3.
The female landowner faces a social identity loss 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 when she chooses to prescribe high

conservation effort while offering a traditional rental contract. The tenant similarly faces
a social identity loss 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 when he obeys this prescription and puts in 𝑒𝑒2 = 2. Now let us

consider the game solution by evaluating the choices and payoffs along each branch of
the game tree.
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Figure 1.3 Numerical illustration of decision tree of female landowner and male tenant

Using backward induction, it is optimal for the tenant to put in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 when
offered the traditional rent with no prescription and 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 when offered a

discounted rent. When the female landowner offers a fixed rental contract with

prescription, the male tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 when 55 − PL < 50 − IT ⇒ 5 +
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 < 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿

That is, the loss from breaking the relationship is greater than monetary loss of
conserving 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 and the identity loss. Therefore, the tenant puts in the prescribed
conservation effort.

If 55 − PL > 50 − IT ⇒ 5 + 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 > 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 the tenant’s loss from breaking the relationship is
less than 5 and identity losses, then he puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1
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The SPNE for this game tree are:
i)

5 + 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 < 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2; the landowner compares her

payoffs of $50 from NP,R branch, $51 from P,DR and $61 − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 from P,R

branch and offers a fixed rent with prescription when 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔 − 𝑰𝑰𝑳𝑳 > 𝟓𝟓𝟓𝟓 ⇒

ii)

𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 > 𝑰𝑰𝑳𝑳

5 + 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 < 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2; and 10 < 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 then the
landowner offers a discounted rent.

iii)

5 + 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 > 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 , the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1; the landowner compares her

payoffs of $50 from NP,R branch, $51 from P,DR branch and $50 − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 from
P,R branch and offers a discounted rent with prescription.

Figure 1.4 Decision tree of numerical illustration of all other gendered interactions
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From the decision tree in Figure 1.4, using backward induction, the male tenant would
put in 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 when 55 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 < 50 ⇒ 5 < 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 and 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 when 5 > 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿

Therefore, in case of an interaction with male landowner male tenant, a female landowner
and a female tenant or a male landowner and a female tenant, there is only a need to
weigh loss from the relationship breaking and the net economic loss from putting in the
prescribed amount.
The SPNE for this game tree are:
i)

5 < PL, the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 the landowner compares his/her

payoffs of $50 from NP,R branch, $51 from P,DR and $61 from P,R branch
and offers a fixed rent with prescription.

ii)

5 > 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿 , the tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒1 = 2, 𝑒𝑒2 = 1; the landowner compares his/her

payoffs of $50 from NP,R branch, $51 from P,DR branch and $50 from P,R
branch and offers either a fixed rent with no prescription or a fixed rent

without prescription. Behaviorally it would make sense for the landowner to
prescribe while offering the fixed rent because he/she faces no identity loss
from doing so.
Incorporating identity losses, our model predicts that female landowners would not
choose to prescribe while offering a traditional rental contract to the tenant as that would
lead to an identity loss. Moreover, male tenants would not put in 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 when receiving
prescription from a female landowner as that would lead to an identity loss for the male
tenant. Therefore, the female landowners are more likely to offer a traditional rental
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contract with no prescription even though that means tenant puts in 𝑒𝑒2 = 1 or opt for the
costlier alternative of offering a discounted rent.

For all other gendered interactions, as there are no social identity losses when offering a
prescription, the landowner will be indifferent between offering a fixed rent contract with
or without prescription. The landowner would be more likely to prescribe, if he/she
thought that prescription would convince the tenant to put in 𝑒𝑒2 = 2 and the landowner
could make $61.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model of the strategic interactions between a
landowner (principal) and tenant (agent) in the context of a land rental contract involving
production of crops as well as ecosystem services. We find that implementation of
conservation efforts on leased land (and most of the farmland in the US is leased)
depends on the conflict between preserving a contractual relationship between the
landowner and the tenant and the social identity losses related to following prescriptions,
both for the principal and the agent. Entrenched social norms within farming
communities may prevent male tenants from choosing to preserve a contractual
relationship with a female landowner. Here, if the female makes prescriptions about
conservation land use practices (despite suffering losses in identity from managing her
tenant), the tenant may not implement them because he suffers identity losses. In this
scenario, the only way to ensure ecosystem services provision is for the female
landowner to part with some of her rental income by striking a discounted rental contract
agreement with her tenant or be okay with no prescription and low conservation effort
from the tenant. This outcome suggests that public ecosystem services benefits can only
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be realized at the expenses of private pecuniary benefits to the female landowner (since
she must pay the rental discount) assuming that the tenant will resist prescribed activities
owing to loss of identity. One way to address this issue would be to seek interventions
that minimize identity loss faced by female landowners and their male tenants.
The next step of this research involves identifying mechanisms which can be used to
implement conservation land use efforts under a traditional contractual setting. For this
purpose, we plan on using controlled laboratory experiments to study the role of gender
within and across farming communities on rental agreements and conservation effort
choice. Experiments will also be useful in evaluating the internal validity of our
theoretical model.
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Chapter 2
Role of Gender Identity on Conservation Outcomes on Leased Land – A
Lab Experiment
2.1 Introduction
It is well documented that there is a demographic shift in the agricultural landscape of the
United States and more women are becoming landowners. Women landowners make up
37% of total nonoperating landowners (NOLs) 5 and own about 25% of the 354 million
acres rented out for farming every year (United States Department of Agriculture(USDA)
Census of Agriculture 2014). In some states such as Iowa, 47% of all acres and 55% of
all leased acres are owned by women. 6 In the recent agriculture census in 2017 women
were better represented in federal data and the findings indicate that at least one woman
is at the helm in 60% of farming operations either as an operating landowner or a nonoperating one. 7
Organizations such as American Farmland Trust that have worked with women
landowners find that women face gendered barriers as landowners because they don’t
have enough access to resources about conservation and don’t feel they have a seat at the
table. 8 This lack of access to resources may impact the landowner tenant relationship in
two different ways: (1) female landowners may be perceived as knowing less about
Majority (87%) of the people who own land do not farm and are called nonoperating landowners (NOLs)
(Bigelow et al. , 2016).
6
A new outreach project in Iowa funded in 2021 is aiming to understand the needs, challenges, and
opportunities of women landowners: https://www.extension.iastate.edu/news/women-landowners-arefocus-new-outreach-project
7
This article highlights the demographic shift and documents the barriers women face as landowners and
farmers in the United States: https://psmag.com/economics/women-own-half-the-farmland-in-americathey-dont-earn-half-the-profits
8
See https://farmland.org/research-shows-to-increase-conservation-on-americas-farms-focus-on-womenlandowners/
5
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conservation and therefore their conservation demands are ignored, (2) female
landowners demand less conservation because of a lack of knowledge about best
management practices. Masuda et al. (2020) point out that by design conservation
programs in the US may miss key actors as they generally target farmers or “operators”
who are not the same people who own the land. If a landowner signs USDA’s power of
attorney form, it lets the federal agencies bypass the NOL and directly access farmers
with conservation incentives increasing the communication and knowledge gap between
landowners and tenants.
To assess NOLs’ views on conservation practices and collaborating with
operators/tenants Petrzelka et al. (2021) conducted a multistate survey of NOLs from 13
states during 2018-2020. This study identifies that most lease agreements are verbal in
nature and renewed annually although an average length of relationship between a
landowner and a tenant range between 8-17 years. Due to the verbal and year to year
nature of leases, this study finds that there is a communication gap between landowners
and tenants. NOLs are either not aware of the conservation programs and therefore afraid
to broach the topic with their tenants(particularly women NOLs); tenants find it risky to
make conservation investments due to the year-to-year nature of leases. Masuda et al.
(2020) also point out, that existing leases don’t provide mechanisms to share upfront
conservation costs. To our knowledge, Weigel et al. (2021)’s field randomized controlled
trials with NOLs is the first study that looks at how NOLs in the upper Mississippi River
Basin respond to nudge and financial incentives to adopt cover crops. The study could
not detect an effect on cover crop adoption from its main treatments- a nudge in the lease
language and financial incentive to conserve.
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Given the backdrop of misalignment between conservation incentives for the landowner
and the tenant and the specific gendered barriers that women landowners face, we model
a landowner- tenant interaction to study the effects of behavioral responses of male
tenants towards female landowners and the contract choices landowners make to
facilitate conservation. Given that the landowner wants conservation on their land and
tenant does not have an incentive to conserve – is there a gendered difference in the type
of incentives offered and consequent conservation choice by the tenant? This is the
primary research question that has not been explored and is an important contribution to
the literature on design and effectiveness of lease choices and conservation outcomes.
On the field, leases are verbal, informal, and bound by expectations. The verbal nature of
leases underscore the critical role of identity and social norms in determining
conservation outcomes. Our study is able to speak to the different mechanisms at play
regarding why women are hesitant to require conservation- and addresses the two main
constraints female landowners face noted in (1) and (2) above. By implementing common
knowledge in our experiment, we remove the impediment of a lack of knowledge that
female landowners face in the field and we get to parse the gendered differences in lease
choice and consequent conservation choices. Moreover, our study also addresses the
issue of the communication gap highlighted in the literature by introducing
communication in some treatments and having no communication in others. This allows
us to test the effect of communication gap on conservation outcomes. We also get to
examine what happens with this communication gap is bridged how that impacts
landowner’s lease choices and the tenant’s conservation choices.
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We test our model in a context neutral laboratory experiment where we call the
landowner “Owner” and the tenant “Renter”. The main task of the landowner is to rent
out their asset to the tenant who must choose between two possible actions- conserve and
don’t conserve. The contract choice of the owner and the action choice of the renter
determines their payoffs. Unlike our model in chapter 1, where the tenant can allocate his
efforts between production and conservation this model focusses on the single task of
conservation. By design the landowners are induced to want the tenant to choose the
conservation outcome because they earn an additional payoff benefit if the tenant chooses
to conserve. Tenants are aware of the landowner’s benefits from choosing the
conservation outcome. This design creates an environment in which I can examine two
aspects about the landowner tenant relationship: 1)Contract selection: do male and
female landowners make different contract choices when trying to incentivize
conservation ? 2) Response to contract selection: do male tenants respond to landowners’
same contract choices differently based on their gender?
In our experiment, the owner can choose between three possible contract choices: 1)
fixed rent 2) fixed rent with penalty and 3) fixed rent with discount. A fixed rent contract
is like the cash rental leases prevalent between landowners and tenants. The fixed rent
with penalty results in the tenant accruing an additional cost if they choose the nonconservation outcome. Ranjan et al. (2019) find that one barrier to conservation on rented
land is the competitiveness of the rental market. The competitive nature of the rental
markets increases the tenant’s insecurity about lease renewal which makes the tenant
hesitant to make permanent conservation changes on the land. In our model we liken the
insecurity of losing the contract to a competitive rental market as the cost of penalty. The
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fixed rent with discount mimics the features of a fixed rent contract with an opportunity
for the landowner to offer a discount to the tenant. This discount ranges between 10-100,
where 10-40 points partially offsets conservation costs, 50 points just offsets conservation
costs and 60-100 points overcompensates the tenant for choosing to conserve. Discounts
that offset or partially offset conservation costs are not just a theoretical construct.
Extension has been promoting such contracts for conservation on rented land (Cox,
2010). Further Sawadgo et al. (2021) find that a sizeable number of landowners are
willing to incentivize their tenants by partly offsetting their conservation costs. 9
2.1.1 Literature Review
Experimental literature shows that gender identity plays an important role in determining
an individual’s reluctance to initiate salary negotiations ( Bowles et al., 2007; Babcock
and Laschever, 2009), to compete ( Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), willingness to accept
tasks that have low promotability (Babcock et al., 2017). Arnold et al. (2021) find that
even among children aged 4 and 9 years, gender differences in negotiation emerge-when
given a chance to negotiate for a bonus from a male and female evaluator, boys asked for
the same bonus from the evaluators regardless of their gender while older girls asked for
a smaller bonus from a male than a female evaluator.
In the context of gender and contract selection, Murad et al. (2019) compare the piece
rate and fixed rate contracts in a multi-task setting, where agents perform real effort tasks
within a given time interval. The study concludes that men choose higher effort levels in

Petrzelka et al. (2021) note that after attending a learning circle conducted by American Farmland Trust
and Cornell Cooperative Extension one of the female landowners set up an arrangement with her tenant to
plant cover crops each fall and offered a discount of 25% of his annual lease.

9
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tasks that highlight their social image, women choose comparatively lower effort choices
in such treatments. The author finds that women have more of an aversion to stand out.
This behavior has been studied in psychology and termed the “wallflower effect.” Jones
and Linardi (2014) found that the wallflower effect is particularly strong in women; that
is, women are more averse to positive or negative reputation and prefer to signal they are
“average” to their teammates. In fact, when we test our model in the laboratory, we find
that female participants choose the fixed rent contract more than male participants. The
fixed rent contract does not involve either the penalty or the discount which makes us
conjecture if the female participants were trying to signal to the tenants that they are
“average”.
A more recent study on gender and contract selection by Li et al. (2021) examine two
different ways in which employers can motivate a worker to exert effort in a single taska relational contract, where a worker earns a bonus for following the employer’s
prescription; or a transactional contract where workers face a fine if they are caught
shirking. This study is the closest to the question we are interested to examine, albeit in a
different context. The hypothesis that women would opt for more relational (bonus)
contracts than men does not follow, in the experiment. Li et al. (2021) do not find many
significant differences between female and male employers in terms of contract choice
other than the fact that women offer more generous contract terms. Our study differs
from Li et al.(2021)’s study in four important ways: 1)we don’t examine uncertainty if
discount will be offered when a fixed rent with discount is chosen. Both landowners and
tenants know that if tenant chooses the conservation outcome in a discount contract, the
discount will be applied and the landowner will have to pay for it, 2) there are no
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monitoring costs for the landowner to check if tenant is choosing conservation outcome,
3) there are no probabilities of tenant getting caught shirking. This is because our game
has complete and perfect information and both landowner and tenant know what contract
and action choices were made, 4) we allow landowners to choose between three different
contract choices. While Li et al. (2021) examine penalty and bonus contracts, the contract
with no penalty or no discount was not an option. We find that when it comes to contract
choice, male participants are in fact offering more discount contracts than women
Moreover, we find evidence that female participants chose to offer more fixed rent
contracts with no penalty or discounts, compared to male participants.
The second aspect we are interested to test is the male renter’s behavioral responses to
female and male landowners for the same contract offered. A growing and substantial
number of studies in economic experimental literature have been evaluating the
difference between behavioral responses to men and women in leadership positions.
While the landowner is not a “leader” as such, he/she does have authority over the land
he/she owns and can choose conservation provisions he/she would like implemented on
their land by the tenant. Findings from experimental studies indicate that women are
evaluated more negatively than men (Gangadharan et al., 2015); Ayalew et al. (2018);
(Grossman et al 2019); (Abel, 2019); (Chakraborty and Serra,2021). In our design, a
tenant can express disagreement with the landowner by choosing not to conserve, which
would lead to the landowner not receiving additional payoff benefits due to the tenant’s
choice.
Testing the above aspects of gender and contract selection in a laboratory experiment
helps us to avoid multiple confounds field studies may face - such as the specific nature
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of a landowner’s relationship with the tenant, or external issues specific to the land,
making it difficult to separate the contribution of gender identity-related factors to the
conservation practices in place. Also, convincing enough landowners and tenants to let
the experiment dictate how they get paired up and interact with each other to determine a
farming outcome would likely be very hard to achieve, particularly to get sample sizes
large enough for meaningful analysis. A lab experiment on the other hand, provides an
excellent controlled environment to study such behavior and makes clear identification of
research questions possible.
In our four treatments of interest, participants are assigned to female landowner-male
tenant (FM) groups or male landowner-male tenant groups (MM) based on their reported
gender. One treatment allows participants to chat with each other (FMPC and MMPC)
and another treatment does not allow chat between participants (FMP and MMP). In all
these treatments participants gender identities are primed.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First male tenants choose a significantly
higher proportion of conservation for male landowners compared to female landowners
in both with and without communication treatments, partially confirming our hypothesis.
Moreover, proportion of conservation outcomes significantly increase in communication
outcomes, suggesting that a lack of communication is an important contributing factor to
the tenant’s conservation choice. We find that female landowners contrary to our
hypothesis, offer more fixed rent with penalty and fixed rent contracts compared to male
landowners. Female landowners choose fewer fixed rent with discount contracts
compared to male landowners. When we examine the types of discounts offered, we find
that female landowners choose discounts that partially or just offsets the conservation
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costs. Male landowners on the other hand, tended to offer discounts that
overcompensated conservation costs. Upon closer inspection we find that male
landowners were being more strategic and offering a particular discount value (60 points)
that would overcompensate the tenant by only 10 points, thereby letting them receive
payoff benefits while male tenants choose to conserve(male tenants earn 10 points more
than what they would earn if they chose not to conserve). This pattern of discount value
choice makes us conjecture if male landowners and male tenants were being overly
friendly with each other because of their shared identity (as indicated by the gender icons
displayed at every payoff table). Female landowners catch on to this strategy in
treatments where communication is allowed. However, not by enough to close the gap
between conservation outcomes with male and female landowners.

2.2 Theoretical Analysis
Our strategic environment is represented by a sequential move game ΓN [i, ΣL,ΣT, ui(.)]
with perfect information where 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐿𝐿, 𝑇𝑇, are the players. Here, L is the landowner and T
is the tenant.

Landowner’s Strategy Set: 𝚺𝚺𝐋𝐋 = {𝐅𝐅, 𝐏𝐏, 𝐃𝐃}

F indicates the landowner has chosen a fixed rental contract, which neither penalizes nor
incentivizes provision of the conservation practice; P indicates the landowner has chosen
a fixed rental contract with penalty. In this case, the tenant faces an upfront penalty if
they do not implement the conservation practice. D indicates a fixed rent contract with a
discount offered to the tenant to partially offset the costs of implementing conservation
practices on the land.
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Tenant’s Strategy Set: 𝚺𝚺𝐓𝐓 = {𝐂𝐂, 𝐃𝐃𝐃𝐃}

C or “Conserve” indicates conservation practices were adopted and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 or “Don’t
Conserve” indicates conservation practices were not adopted.

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 are the strategy choices of the landowner and tenant respectively and
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) is the payoff function for each economic agent.

The structure of the game mimics a landowner-tenant interaction. The payoff structure is
designed to meet the following criteria:
1. The landowner gets a payoff benefit over and above the rental income when the
tenant chooses to conserve(C). We denote this additional payoff benefit as B. This
payoff benefit captures the intrinsic gains and pecuniary gains to the landowner
from the tenant implementing conservation practices on the land, in the long run.
Intrinsic gains include environmental gains (related to the landowner’s
environmental values) and pecuniary gains include increased productivity from
implementing pro-conservation activities on the land (Ranjan et al., 2019). The
landowner gets no additional payoff benefits when the tenant chooses not to
conserve (DC).
2. If the landowner chooses the contract with the penalty, there are no pecuniary
costs involved for the landowner. If this contract is offered, the tenant incurs an
additional cost (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 ) if he chooses DC. We use this additional cost to capture a
potential long-term real-world outcome that could not be captured in a static

environment: the landowner may choose not to renew the contract with the tenant
if the tenant has ignored his/her request, which would impose a cost on the tenant.
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As noted by Ranjan et al. (2019), land rental markets in the U.S. are very
competitive. Moreover, community social networks in most rural communities are
quite close knit (Carter, 2019), making it easy for the landowner to spread the
word about them seeking new tenants. So even if the tenant discontinues the lease
because the landowner chooses P, the landowner incurs no additional costs and
can costlessly find another tenant to contract with.
3. If the landowner chooses to offer a discount, there is a pecuniary cost involved for
the landowner. If this contract is offered, some or all of the conservation costs of
the tenant are offset. Such contracts are promoted by University Extension (Cox,
2010).
We make the following assumptions about our model:
Assumption 1
We assume both landowner and tenant make the same environmental value gains (B)
from conservation practices being implemented on land. Assigning a uniform
environmental value, in terms of payoffs, across the board for the landowners and the
tenants helps us account for the gendered motivations that leads to differences in strategy
choices for the tenant and the landowner. Moreover, our experiment is context neutral
and does not indicate in any way that any of the participant’s actions are conservation
related.
Assumption 2
The tenant’s pecuniary value of output from choosing C (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ) is greater than the

tenant’s pecuniary value of output from choosing DC (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ). However, adding the
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conservation benefits B to the tenant’s pecuniary value from choosing C lets the tenant
earn the same total benefits from choosing C and from choosing DC. Keeping the value
of the output from C and DC equal allows us to simplify choices that face the tenants and
minimize errors that may happen in calculating net benefits from each option.
Assumption 3
For the tenant, the cost of choosing C (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) is greater than the cost of choosing DC (𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ).

This assumption is in keeping with the nature of the rental contract. Access to land for the
tenants depend on the length of the contract. If their contract is not renewed the tenant
cannot recover the costs of conservation practices, he incurred. This is especially the
case for conservation practices such as no till and cover crops where the environmental
benefits accrue to the landowner over the long term.
Assumption 4
If the landowner chooses to offer a discount (𝑑𝑑1 )he/she incurs the cost of the discount

they are offering. This cost is less than the additional payoff benefits they gain when the
tenant chooses to conserve i.e. (𝑑𝑑1 < 𝐵𝐵).
Assumption 5

There is no asymmetry of information between landowner and tenant about the
competitive nature of the rental market.
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2.2.1 Payoffs of the Landowner and the Tenant

The payoffs for a landowner in the game are:
𝑢𝑢𝐿𝐿 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) =

𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 )
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹, 𝑃𝑃 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃 ………….(1)
� 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵)
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷
𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 )

Where 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 is the landowner’s rental income, 𝑑𝑑1 is the value of discount offered by the
landowner in a fixed rent with discount contract, B is the additional payoff that the

landowner gets from the tenant choosing C. 𝐿𝐿1 is the marginal utility associated with
monetary gains.

The payoffs for the tenant are:
𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷
𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃
𝑢𝑢𝑇𝑇 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) =
⎨ 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃
⎩𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑑𝑑1 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑇𝑇 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐿𝐿 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷
⎧

……(2)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the cost of choosing C—that is, the cost of implementing conservation practices, 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃

is the penalty imposed by the landowner and 𝑅𝑅1 is the marginal utility coefficient from
the monetary gains made by the tenant.
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Figure 2.1 Decision tree and payoffs for the landowner and tenant
Given this strategic setting, Figure 2.1 represents the decision tree and payoffs for the
landowner and the tenant with the landowner being the first mover. We make the
following observations for the lease choice made by the landowner
When offered contract F, it is payoff maximizing for the tenant to choose DC by avoiding
additional conservation cost 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .

When offered P, given that 𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 = 𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 2), the tenant’s choice
of C depends on whether the cost of penalty (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 ) covers the difference between the cost

of choosing conservation (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and not choosing conservation (𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ). From here onwards
we call the cost differential that defines the extra cost the tenant must bear when he
chooses C, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 .

51

When offered D, it is payoff maximizing for the tenant to choose C if 𝑑𝑑1 is greater than
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

Given these observations, three possible scenarios for Nash Equilibria emerge, depending
upon the relative magnitudes of 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 :
1) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 > [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]

It is in the tenant’s best interest to choose to conserve when offered P, the penalty
is greater than the additional cost of adopting conservation practices. Knowing
this the landowner will choose the fixed rent with penalty contract.

Therefore, the SPNE for this scenario is

Equilibrium Payoffs

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝑃𝑃} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {C}

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )

2) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 < [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]

Owing to the relative magnitudes of the costs, the only way in which the
landowner can incentivize the tenant to adopt conservation when the penalty is

less than the cost differential, is to pay a discount which will fully or more than
fully compensate for costs of implementing conservation land uses. Recall that the
penalty is meant to capture the fact that landowners in the real-world may choose
to terminate a rental agreement when the tenant does not choose the desired action
C. This scenario describes an equilibrium outcome when transaction costs for the
landowner to find another tenant is high.

52

The SPNE for this scenario is
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = DC if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
Equilibrium Payoffs
1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )

or

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )

3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

3) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 = [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]

In this case, the tenant should be indifferent between choosing C or DC when

offered P. Knowing that the tenant should be indifferent between choosing C and
DC, the landowner will not want to incur the cost of offering a discount and will
instead offer a fixed rent with penalty to the tenant such that the tenant chooses C
and the landowner earns the additional payoff benefit, B. However, if the tenant
does not choose C the landowner switches to offering a fixed rent with discount
contract.
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There are therefore two possible SPNE for such a scenario:
1) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝑃𝑃} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {𝐶𝐶}
Equilibrium Payoffs

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )
2) 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 } and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {DC} if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

Equilibrium Payoffs

1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )

or

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )

3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
When the nature of the land rental market is such that the landowner and tenant have
equal standing, non-pecuniary attitudes might drive the actions of the two players leading
to specific behaviors. Given the current nature of farmland rental market being
competitive, my research focuses on gender identity effects that arise from the strategic
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interactions between a female landowner and a male tenant. As a result, following the
identity loss theory presented by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), the strategic setting can be
modified by introducing two additional terms to the landowner and the tenant’s payoff
functions representing their identity losses from interacting with each other when
establishing a rental contract.
For female landowners and male tenants there is an additional identity loss component to
their payoff utility as was discussed in the earlier chapter.
For the purposes of this model, identity loss of the landowner is depicted by 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ). It
is a function of the gender of the landowner and contract choice.
𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ) = �

>0
=0

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

Identity loss of the tenant is depicted by 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 ). It is a function of the gender of the

landowner and the contract offered by him/her. This loss is a negative identity externality
that arises because male tenant is following the prescriptions of female landowner who is

going against the social norm by using penalty rental contract to ensure that tenant
chooses C.
𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 )
= �

>0
=0

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑡𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶
𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
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Figure 2.2 Decision tree for the interaction between female landowner and male tenant
Figure 2 shows the decision tree for the interaction between a female landowner and a
male tenant. When the female landowner offers a fixed rent with a penalty contract, she
would be going against the social prescriptions of the rural community and therefore
incurs an identity loss 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 .

When the male tenant follows the requirements of the fixed rent with the penalty, he also

faces an identity loss 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 .

The possible sub game perfect Nash equilibrium for a female landowner and male tenant
are as follows:
1) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 > [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]
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For purely economic reasons, it is in the tenant’s best interest to conserve. However, the
tenant will weigh his identity losses against these incentives and the following scenarios
arise:
i)

𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 − [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ] ≥ 𝑰𝑰𝑻𝑻 (𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳 , 𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 )

Here the tenant has a clear incentive to conserve as the financial gains from conserving is
greater than or equal to his identity loss.
The female landowner must weigh her identity loss against the cost of offering a
discount.
So we have two scenarios:
a) Cost of discount is greater than or equal to the landowner’s identity loss
𝑑𝑑1 ≥ 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿

The female landowner will choose a fixed rent with penalty contract and SPNE for this
scenario is the same as the male landowner and male tenant scenario.

Equilibrium Payoffs

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝑃𝑃} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {C}

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 �𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 )�, 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) − 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇 (𝐺𝐺𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 )

b) Cost of discount is less than the landowner’s identity loss 𝑑𝑑1 < 𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿
The SPNE for this scenario is given by:

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {DC} if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
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Equilibrium Payoffs
1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )
or
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )

3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

Therefore, for case i), even when the tenant has a clear incentive to conserve the female
landowner would not always choose the penalty contract like a male landowner would.
ii)

𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 − [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ] < 𝑰𝑰𝑻𝑻 (𝑮𝑮𝑳𝑳 , 𝝈𝝈𝑳𝑳 )

If the identity losses of the tenant outweigh the financial incentive of conserving, and the
tenant experiences reactance to the female landowner choosing a penalty contract, the
tenant will choose not to conserve.
The female landowner will always offer a discount in this case to incentivize the tenant to
undertake conservation
The SPNE for this scenario is given by:
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {DC} if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

Equilibrium Payoffs

1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

58

2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )
or
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )
3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
c) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 < [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]

The tenant does not have a clear financial incentive to conserve, female landowners
will choose a discount contract for the tenant. Since tenant does not have a clear
financial incentive to conserve there he does not need to weigh financial incentives
against his identity losses.
The SPNE for this scenario is
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = C 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = 𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = DC if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
Equilibrium Payoffs
1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )

or

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )
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3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

3) 𝑪𝑪𝑷𝑷 = [𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪 − 𝑪𝑪𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 ]

When faced with case 3 above where the penalty is equal to conservation costs. Due to
identity losses, instead of being indifferent between choosing C and DC the male tenant
will choose DC when offered P by a female landowner. Since the female landowner also
undergoes an identity loss by choosing penalty, she will choose a fixed rent with
discount to incentivize the tenant to choose Action D.
Our model therefore predicts that for scenario 3, the SPNE for a female landowner and a
male tenant is:
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝐷𝐷} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {C} if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝐷𝐷} 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {C} 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 {𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷} 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 = {𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹 } and 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 = {DC} if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

Equilibrium Payoffs:

1) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 −
𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

2) if 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 + 𝐵𝐵 − 𝑑𝑑1 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝐵𝐵 + 𝑑𝑑1 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )

or

𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )

3) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 (𝜎𝜎𝐿𝐿 , 𝜎𝜎𝑇𝑇 ) = 𝐿𝐿1 (𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 ), 𝑅𝑅1 (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 − 𝛱𝛱𝐿𝐿 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) if 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]
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2.3 Objective of the Experiment
In this study, we conduct an experiment to evaluate the role of gender identity effects on
rental contract choice and conservation outcomes that comes out of the interaction
between a landowner and a tenant. The design of my experiment is informed by the
theoretical model presented in the previous section which indicates that given social
dynamics in rural communities, female landowners can ensure conservation- focused
land uses on their properties if they offer a rental discount to their male tenant.
Our model predicts several possible outcomes that depend on the cost of penalty and the
extra cost of conservation. We focus on case 3 where penalty is equal to the conservation
costs and the main outcomes are driven by the gender identity of the landowner and the
tenant. Particularly, unlike case 1 and 2, this is the case where the tenant has no clear
incentive to choose C or DC. Due to identity losses our model predicts that the tenant will
choose DC for a female landowner and C for a male landowner when offered a penalty
contract. This experiment therefore investigates the difference in conservation outcomes
in an interaction between a female landowner and male tenant due to the landowner’s and
tenant’s identity losses, which are absent in the male landowner and male tenant
interaction scenario.
The objective of the experiment is to test three questions based on the elements that lead
to different conservation outcomes in our theoretical model :
1) Are female landowners more likely to offer a discount to encourage conservation
effort than male landowners?
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2) Does the gender of the landowner influence action choice of the tenant?

3) Is there any difference in compensation for female and male landowners in terms
of discounts offered to tenants?
2.4 Experimental Design
The treatment variables of interest for this experiment are 1) genders of landowner and
tenant are revealed to each other; 2) genders of landowner and tenant are revealed and
primed; 3) landowner and tenants are allowed to chat with each other. In the control
condition, communication is not allowed, there is no priming for gender, and gender is
not revealed. The treatments are implemented in a between-subject design, giving rise to
8 different experimental treatments as depicted in Table 2.1. We describe the treatments
in further detail below. We implement fixed matching –participants interact with the
same participant across all rounds. We use this matching technique to examine how
gender impacts choice of contract and conservation over time, particularly to see if the
need to signal and build reputation differs across genders of the participants. These
effects could not be captured in a one-shot game. In case of random rematching, it would
be difficult to ensure that the Female- Male or Male-Male dynamic, that we are interested
to study is maintained throughout the session.
In the No priming, Gender revealed treatments, gender was revealed by displaying the
gender icons of the participants in the payoff tables. In treatments, T3, T4, T7 and T8 we
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also implement a priming intervention to make gender salient to the participants. 10 In
treatments where gender was revealed and primed, female, and male participants read a
text. The text was taken from D’Acunto(2015) ‘s priming task used to activate
participant’s interpretation of gender identity stereotypes. We first ask participants
whether they related to the passage where 1= Relate strongly, 2= Relate somewhat 3=
Relate very little 4= Do not relate. Then they are asked to write 5-10 sentences reflecting
on a time when they behaved in line with the text.
We call landowners “Owners” and tenants “Renters” in our setting, to keep it context
neutral. We also refer to the conservation outcome as “Action D” and no conservation
outcome as “Action G”. This was done so participants don’t attach their own
environmental values to their choices. We also picked random letters of the alphabet
instead of one that has any order such Action A and Action B so that participants don’t
attach any hierarchy to the choices they are making. For the purposes of this paper, we
will call Action D the “Conserve” choice and Action G the “Don’t Conserve” choice.

10 Priming is a common psychological technique that heightens the exposure of the intervention which in our case is
making participants’ gender identity salient. Experimental literature in Economics has examined effects of priming
gender identity on economic and financial decision-making. Meier- Pesti and Penz (2008) find male gender salience
increases willingness to take risks for male participants while making female gender salient decreases risk taking for
female participants. Benjamin Choi and Strickland(2010) find no effect of gender salience on intertemporal risk
choices. D’Acunto (2015) finds that men whose identity is primed or threatened become more risk tolerant but there is
no effect of identity manipulation on women’s risk taking and investment behavior.
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Table2. 1 Experiment design
No
priming,
Gender
not
revealed
Control

No priming, Gender
revealed

Priming, Gender
revealed

Male-Male

FemaleMale

MaleMale

FemaleMale

No
Communication

T1

T2

T3

T4

Communication

T5

T6

T7

T8

2.4.1 Experimental Procedures
The experiment was conducted in oTree (Chen et al., 2016) and implemented on-line
using Zoom. The experiments were conducted with University of Nebraska- Lincoln
students during 2021. Participants were recruited from the university student population.
They reported the gender they identified with when signing up for experiments. They
were assigned to the treatments based on the gender they reported. On entering the Zoom
room participants were renamed as Participant 1,2, and so on to maintain anonymity.
They were asked to keep themselves on mute and never turn on their videos during the
session. The instructions were shared in a presentation format and viewed through screen
sharing on Zoom. Participants also had access to detailed instructions through a link in
the oTree interface that opened a Google document. The option to download or print this
document was disabled.
Figure 2.3 describes the timeline of the treatments and stages of the decision task as they
are implemented during a session. Participants read the priming passage before being
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instructed about the decision task, in priming treatments 11. In all other treatments and in
control, participants begin with the decision task (Part 2).
The decision task consists of 2 stages. First the landowner chooses between 3 types of
contracts they can offer to the tenant. In the experimental interface, the landowner first
decides between a fixed rent contract and fixed rent with discount contract. Payoff tables
show earnings from all three contract choices. If they choose a fixed rent contract, they
are then taken to the next page that displays payoffs from fixed rent with and without
penalty contracts. Landowners specify if they would like to impose a penalty of 50 points
to the tenant. We designed the interface in this way 1) to make it easier for participants
to navigate the payoff tables by allowing them to see the relevant payoffs based on their
choice, 2) to ensure landowners make a mindful choice when they choose penalty. If the
landowners chose fixed rent with discount they saw earnings of the discount payoff table.
Landowners then specify the value of discount they would like to choose. The tenant is
informed about the landowner’s contract choice. The tenant chooses between C and DC.
Participants realize their payoffs. To verify understanding of the decision task
participants answered a comprehension quiz and a practice session consisting of two
rounds. The decision task is repeated for 15 rounds with fixed matching. In treatments
where communication is allowed, participants chat with each other at the beginning of
every round of the decision task for 1 minute 30 seconds.

This was done so that participants learn about their role and instructions pertaining to the task
after their gender identity had been primed.

11

65

Priming
Treatments

Participants
read the
priming text
and reflect on
the passage

Decision Task

Instructions
for Decision
Task,
followed by
Quiz and
Practice
Session

Stage 1
Owner
makes a
contract
choice

Stage 2
Renter
makes an
action
choice

Post experimental
questionnaire

Demographic
+Perception
questionnaire

Gender
stereotyping
tendencies
elicited (in all
treatments
except
control)

Part 3

Part 4

(Participants chat at the
beginning of every round in
communication treatments)

Part 1

Part 2

Figure 2.3 Timeline of experimental procedures
After completing the decision task, participants stop at Part 3, with the demographic and
perception questionnaire if they have been assigned the control session. In this
questionnaire we gather details about the year of their degree program. We also ask them
how they perceived the other participant.
In all the treatments, other than control, participants answered some additional questions
related to their gender stereotyping tendencies. We do this using two measures:
1) We use an explicit gender stereotyping association scale from Pardal et al (2020).
We asked participants to estimate the percentage of women and men in their dayto-day life that they believe are strong negotiators. A difference score is
calculated by subtracting the reported percentage of men from the reported
percentage of women. Higher (positive) numbers denote stronger explicit
associations between women and negotiation competence and lower (negative)
numbers denote weaker explicit association between women and negotiation
competence.
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2) Participants answer a modified inventory of Glick and Fiske’s Ambivalent Sexism
Inventory towards women (1996) and Ambivalence towards men(2006). Female
participants answer questions related to sexism towards men and male participants
answer statements that measure sexism towards women. We choose 5 statements
from the benevolent sexism inventory and 5 statements from the hostile sexism
inventory. Hostile sexism inventory captures a participant’s
agreement/disagreement to statements that are hostile towards the other gender.
Benevolent sexism inventory denotes a participant’s agreement/disagreement to
statements that are benevolent to the other gender.
All rounds were used to determine the payoffs denoted in points that were converted into
real US $ at an exchange rate of 211 points for US$1. Participants received a
participation fee of $5. Participants could also track their earnings and choices across
rounds through a round history table. All treatments that did not use communication
lasted for about an hour. The treatments with communication lasted for 1 hour 30
minutes. Average earnings per subject were $15.25 including participation fee.
2.5 Numerical Illustration
We assume the following values for production and conservation efforts in Table 2.2.
The landowner’s rental income is 100 points. The landowner can offer discount with
values ranging from 10 to 100, with values increasing at a constant rate (multiples of 10).
The tenant can choose between C and DC. If the tenant chooses C both the tenant and the
landowner get an additional environmental value worth 125 points. This is because our
model assumes that the tenant gets some benefits from conservation. In other words,
putting in some level of conservation effort is profitable to the tenant. For example,
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conservation tillage is profitable for the tenant due to reduction of labor and machinery
costs while other practices may become profitable over the long term such as strip
cropping, grassed waterways, or terracing. Soule et al. (2000) point out that the mediumor long-term conservation practices that generate public environmental benefits are
particularly impacted due to land being rented by the landowner. Keeping in mind, the
delayed nature of gains from conservation, the tenant’s value of output from choosing C
is 175 points and 300 points from choosing DC. However, upon adding the additional
environmental gains the total output value for C adds up to 300 points The tenant’s cost
of choosing C is 100 points and 50 points for choosing DC. If the landowner offers a
fixed rent with penalty contract, a further cost of 50 points is imposed on the tenant if he
chooses DC.

Table 2.2 Table of parameters
Variables
Landowner’s Rent (R)
Discount values (𝑑𝑑1)

Tenant and Landowner’s Environmental Value from C (𝐵𝐵)
Tenant’s total Value of Output from C (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
Tenant’s total Value of Output when he chooses DC (𝛱𝛱𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 )
Tenant’s cost of choosing C (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 )
Tenant’s cost of choosing DC (𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )
Cost of penalty imposed on the tenant when he chooses DC in a
penalty contract (𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 )

Values (in experimental
currency)
100
[10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70,
80, 90, 100]
125
175
300
100
50
50

Table 2.2 also depicts our focus on case 3 as 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . We then plug these

parameters into payoff functions defined in equation 1 and 2 to get all possible payoffs
presented in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.3 shows the possible payoffs from a Fixed Rent
and Fixed Rent with Penalty contract. The imposition of the penalty is costless for the
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landowner as the landowner’s payoff remains the same across Option 1 and Option 2.
However, the penalty reduces the tenant’s earnings from choosing DC by 50 points. As a
result, the tenant earns 100 points regardless of choosing C or DC in Option 2.

Table 2.3 Payoff Table- Fixed Rent without and with Penalty

Renter Chooses C
What Owner Earns

Renter Chooses DC
Renter Chooses C

What Renter earns
Renter Chooses DC

Option 1
Fixed Rent

Option 2
Fixed Rent with
Penalty

225

225

100

100

100

100

150

100

Table 2.4 shows all possible payoffs from offering a Fixed Rent contract with Discount
to the tenant. The discount value is taken out of the landowner’s payoff when the tenant
chooses C under this contract.
Three types of discount value offers include:
1) Discount values- 10-40 points i.e., 𝑑𝑑1 < [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]- the discount offered does not
fully offset conservation costs for the tenant.

DC or “Don’t Conserve” is the payoff maximizing strategy for the tenant for this
offer.
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2) Discount value 50 points i.e., 𝑑𝑑1 = [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]- the discount just offsets the

conservation costs for the tenant making the tenant indifferent between C and DC.

3) Discount values- 60 -100 points i.e., 𝑑𝑑1 > [𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ]- the discount more than
offsets conservation costs and generates a surplus payoff for the tenant. It is
payoff maximizing for the tenant to choose C.

Table 2.4- Landowner’s view of the payoff tables – Fixed Rent with Discount
Option 3
Discount
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Discounted
Values
Rent
Renter
Chooses
215 205 195 185 175 165 155 145 135 125
C
What
Renter
Owner
Chooses
Earns
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
DC

What the
Renter
earns

Renter
Chooses
C
Renter
Chooses
DC

110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200

150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150

Following our theoretical model and the incorporation of identity loss with female
landowners and male tenants, we present the following conjectures:
1. In a female-male landowner-tenant interaction, female landowners will choose
at least a discount of 50 units if not more to their male tenants to ensure choice
of C.
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2. In a male-male landowner- tenant interaction, male landowners will offer
more fixed rent with penalty contracts compared to fixed rent with discount
contracts as there is no identity loss for male owners.
3. When they do offer discounts, male owners are more likely to offer a discount
in the range of 10-50 points.
Given the conjectures above and the predictions of our model we formulate the
following hypotheses that aim to answer the experimental objectives of our study.

Conservation Outcome Hypotheses:
CO1 : Given the identity loss- we expect male tenants to choose no conservation outcome
more often for female landowners compared to male landowners, for the same contract
type.
CO2: Communication treatments enable tenants and landowners to work together.
Therefore, more conservation outcomes are chosen both for male and female
landowners.

Contract Choice Hypotheses:
CC1: Female landowners are more likely to choose a higher proportion of fixed rent with
discount contracts compared to penalty-based fixed rent contract.
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CC2: Female landowners will concede higher discounts to the renters in the fixed rent
with discount contract, giving higher discounts will result in lower earnings for female
landowners compared to male landowners.
CC3: Female landowners will offer a fixed rent with discount contract more often than
male landowners
CC4: In priming treatments, identity loss is exacerbated. We therefore expect male
landowners to offer a higher proportion of fixed rent with penalty contracts and female
landowners to offer a higher proportion of fixed rent with discount contracts.
CC5: Communication lowers the penalty choices of the landowner as they must
repeatedly interact and answer to the tenant at the beginning of every round.
2.6 Data

Data collection started in Spring, 2021. Table 2.5 reports all data collected so far. We
aimed to collect 20 data points per treatment cell. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to
find the minimum detectable effect size (in terms of gendered differences in conservation
outcomes). Our analysis revealed that in order for this study to have 80% power, there
must be a minimum difference of 11.6% between conservation outcomes between male
landowners and female landowners.

12

My acknowledgements to Vamsi Manthena of Statistical Cross-disciplinary Collaboration and Consulting
(SC3) Lab, Department of Statistics, UNL for helping me with this analysis.
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Table 2.5 Gender composition of groups across treatments

Treatment

No. of
Groups

Participants
Men

Women Non-Binary

Total

Control
Female LandownerNo Prime(FM)
Male LandownerNo Prime(MM)
Female LandownerNo Prime,
Communication(FMC)
Male LandownerNo Prime, Communication(MMC)
Priming (FMP)

20

15

25

20

20

20

16

32

20

20

13

26

20

20

20

0

40

Priming (MMP)

20

39

0

1

40

Priming and
Communication
(FMPC)

20

19

20

1

40

Priming and
Communication
(MMPC)

20

40

-

-

40

0

40
40
32

20

40
26

Total
169
211
105
2
338
Participants were assigned to treatments based on the gender reported when they
volunteered to sign up for experiments. Two participants report a different gender than
the one they had originally signed up with and identify as nonbinary. We will focus on
the priming treatments with and without communication. We are unable to test

73

hypothesis CC4. This is because data collection for T1 and T5 treatments where gender is
made salient with no priming, is underway.

2.7 Results
In this section we report results from four treatments where gender was revealed and
primed with and without communication(T3, T4, T7 and T8). FM pairs indicate female
landowners and MM pairs indicate male landowners. All tenants are male. Our baseline
is the control where gender was neither revealed nor communication allowed between
participants. Table 2.5 indicates the gender composition of participants across these
groups. For the purposes of our analysis, we will focus on Control, FMP, MMP, FMPC,
MMPC.
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics
Participant Perception, Gender Stereotyping Tendencies, Education
We start by describing our subject pool across treatments. In Table 2.6 we report
participant’s education level by gender. Most of our subject pool were graduate students,
with some representation from students in their junior and senior years of undergraduate
study.
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Table 2.6: Frequency distribution of participants’ education level by gender
Gender of
Participant

Male
Female
Non-Binary

Participants’ Education Level
Fres
hman
9.02
7.69
0.00

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

8.27
9.23
0.00

16.54
10.77
0.00

23.31
21.54
50.00

Graduate
Student
40.60
46.15
50.00

Postdoctor
al Scholar

Other

0.75
0.00
0.00

1.50
4.62
0.00

Table 2.7: Frequency distribution of participants’ perception of the decision task by
gender
Gender of
Participant
Male
Female
Non-Binary

Participant’s Perception of Other Participant
Happy
84.96
83.08
50.00

Expect
79.70
64.62
0.00

Adversary
70.68
55.38
50.00

In Table 2.7 we report descriptive statistics about how the participants perceived who
they worked with in the Decision Task. We report these statistics disaggregated by
gender. We capture perception through the following three measures: i) Happy denotes
that a participant is satisfied overall with the decision task; ii) Expect denotes that the
other participant acted in a way that was expected; iii) Adversary denotes that the other
participant was perceived as an adversary as opposed to a collaborator. This helps us to
see if there were any gender-based trends on the participant’s perception of the decision
task and of each other.
The frequency of men and women reporting they were happy with the decision task does
not vary. However, more men (79.7%) reported that the other participant acted in an
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expected way compared to women (64.62%). More men (70.68%) also perceive the
other participant as an adversary compared to women (55.38%).
Since there were only two nonbinary participants, results suggest that one of them was
happy with the task, none of them thought the other participant acted in an expected way
and one of them perceived the other participant as an adversary.
Table 2.8 describes mean scores of participants’ gender stereotyping tendencies across
gender. Gender stereotyping tendencies are captured by the Negotiation Score, Hostile
Sexism Score and Benevolent Sexism Score.
Negotiation Score measure is the participant’s reported percentage of strong men
negotiators in their day-to-day life subtracted from their reported percentage of strong
women negotiators. Higher (positive) numbers denote stronger explicit association
between women and negotiation competence and lower (negative) numbers denote
weaker explicit association between women and negotiation competence. In our gender
primed treatments all male participants responded to hostile and benevolent statements
about females while all female participants responded to hostile and benevolent
statements about males. The Hostile Sexism score is computed by averaging
participant’s responses to statements that are hostile towards the other gender.
Benevolent Sexism score is computed by averaging participant’s responses to statements
that are benevolent towards the other gender. Participants can respond by choosing from
0- disagree strongly, 1- disagree somewhat, 2- disagree slightly, 3- agree slightly, 4 –
agree somewhat, 5- agree strongly. They can also choose 6 to indicate that the statement
is not relevant to them. In averaging out the scores, we did not count the “6” responses
and generated averages based on answers on the statements that had scores 0-5. We
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conducted two sample t-tests between each gender group and found these differences are
statistically significant.
Table 2.8: Participant’s Gender Stereotyping Tendencies by Gender- Mean scores
Negotiation Score
Man

-3.644
(21.424)

Hostile
Sexism
Score
2.053
(1.279)

Benevolent
Sexism Score

Woman

-7.750
(25.466)

3.418
(0.941)

2.005
(1.010)

Non-Binary

7.500
(7.628)

0.300
(0.305)

1.700
(0.305)

2.473
(1.038)

(Standard deviation in parentheses)
We find that, on average, female participants reported stronger beliefs that men are
stronger negotiators than women than the male participants. Men score lower on the
hostile sexism scale than women. Mean hostile scores for male participants indicate that
on average they disagreed slightly with the hostile statements about females. Mean
hostile score for female participants are higher at 3.41 indicating that on average female
participants agreed slightly with the hostile statements about males. The non-binary
participants disagreed strongly with hostile statements towards women. T-Test
comparisons indicate these differences to be statistically significant at the 1% level. The
mean benevolent sexism scores are similar for male and female participants, with the
average score being slightly higher for males compared to females. This difference is
statistically significant at the 1% level. The mean score indicates that male and female
participants disagreed slightly to the benevolent statements about the other gender. The
non-binary population on average, chose “disagree somewhat” to the benevolent
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statements about females. Comparing scores between male and non-binary students, t
tests indicate these differences are not statistically significant.
2.7.2 Descriptive Statistics by Treatments
Table 2.9: Tenant’s perception of landowners across treatments
Control
FMP
FMPC
MMP
MMPC

Adversary
40%
20%
15%
40%
5%
Pearson chi2(4) =
159.5395
p-value = 0.000

Expect
75%
75%
85%
90%
90%
Pearson chi2(4) = 48.9015
p-value = 0.000

Interestingly, in FMP and MMP treatments, only 20% tenants reported that they saw the
female landowner as an adversary whereas, 40% tenants reported they saw the male
landowner as an adversary. Also, when communication is allowed the drop in seeing the
male landowner as an adversary is sharp where only 5% tenants thought their male
landowner was an adversary. The drop in adversary perception is not as sharp for male
tenants when communication is allowed with female landowners- it is 15%. This supports
the evidence we find later that suggests that male tenants were choosing conservation
outcomes more for male landowners compared to female landowners. Moreover, it tells
us that despite male tenants seeing their male landowners as adversaries (at a higher %
than male tenants in FMP treatments) they chose higher conservation outcomes for them
when we compare estimates of conservation outcomes in FMP Vs MMP later.
When it comes to landowners meeting expectations, 90% of male tenants thought their
male landowners acted in a way that was expected. Whereas, with female landowners,
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only 75% of male tenants thought female landowners acted in an expected way in FMP
treatment, while 85% of male tenants thought the female landowner acted in an expected
way in FMPC. This increase points to the effect of communication, as now tenants and
landowners started to co-operate and were on the same page about contract and
conservation choices.
Table 2.10 : Landowner’s perception of tenants across treatments
Control

Adversary
60%

Expect
75%

FMP

80%

40%

FMPC

10%

80%

MMP

60%

60%

MMPC

15%
Pearson chi2(4) = 460.6061
p-value = 0.000

70%
Pearson chi2(4) = 131.8681
p-value = 0.000

In the no communication treatments(FMP and MMP), 80% female landowners reported
they saw their male tenants as adversaries. In the same treatment only 60% male
landowners saw their male tenants as adversaries (the same number as the control). This
perception decreases to 10% for females when communication is allowed and 15% for
males when communication is allowed. Note the stark difference in adversarial
perception between female landowners and their male tenants. In the FMP treatments
alone, 80% female landowners saw their male tenants as adversary compared to the 20%
male tenants who saw their female landowners as adversaries. In MMP treatments, 40%
tenants saw their male landowners as adversary while 60% of male landowners see their
tenants as adversaries. In this experiment, landowners tend to see tenants as more
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adversarial than tenants see their landowners. When communication is allowed, 15%
male tenants see female landowners as adversaries while 10% females perceived their
tenants to be adversaries. However, even with communication, more male landowners
(15%) perceived their tenants as adversary compared to male tenants who perceived their
male landowners as adversaries (5%).
Without communication(FMP and MMP) only 40% of female landowners reported that
their tenant behaved in an expected way while 60% male landowners reported their
tenant behaved in an expected way. In communication treatments 80% of female
landowners report that the male tenant behaved in an expected way compared to 70%
male landowners.
Table 2.11 Gender stereotyping tendencies across treatments – mean scores
Negotiation Score

Hostile Sexism
Score
-6.25
3.585
FMP- F
(29.112)
(0.979)
-3.75
2.15
FMP-M
(25.549)
(1.186)
-2.5
1.435***
Difference
-9.25
3.25
FMPC-F
(21.147)
(0.873)
-0.105
1.653
FMPC- M
(15.216)
(1.263)
-9.145***
1.597***
Difference
-3.795
2.108
MMP
(21.879)
(1.198)
-5.125
2.143
MMPC
(21.097)
(1.371)
-1.330
0.035
Difference
Non-Binary data not reported- Standard deviation in parentheses

Benevolent
Sexism Score
2.215
(0.864)
2.85
(1.185)
-0.635***
1.795
(1.099)
2.489
(0.833)
-0.694***
2.385
(1.0312)
2.3625
(1.011)
-0.022

Table 2.11 shows participant’s gender stereotyping tendencies across treatments. In the
FMPC treatments, female participants have a significantly lower negotiation score than
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male participants. Therefore, more than men, female participants believe men are
stronger negotiators than women.
In FMP treatments, female participants have a higher hostile sexism score than men. The
scores themselves indicate that on average female participants agreed slightly with the
hostile statements about males while males disagreed slightly with hostile statements
about females. This difference persists in FMPC treatments. With benevolent sexism
scores, the trend is reversed, and males report higher scores than females.
There are no significant gender stereotyping differences in male participants across
MMP and MMPC.
Next, we look at treatments and how participants responded to the treatments
implemented.
We compared the landowner’s choice of contracts and the tenant’s choice of conservation
outcome across treatments in treatments where gender was revealed (FMP, MMP, FMPC,
MMPC) and treatments where gender was not revealed (control). We find that when
gender was primed tenants chose the conservation outcome more than they did in control.
Landowners also offered fewer penalties when gender was revealed. Next, we compare
conservation and contract choices in FMP and MMP (no communication) treatments with
FMPC and MMPC (communication) treatments. We find that in treatments where
communication was allowed through chat between landowners and tenants, landowners
offered penalties less and discounts more. Tenants chose to conserve more when
communication was allowed.
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2.7.3 Tenant Behavior
In this section we examine, tenant’s choice to conserve and how it differs with male and
female landowners. We indicate the choice to conserve as C and choice to not conserve
as DC.
Table 2.12 Mean conservation outcomes chosen across treatments
Mean of conservation outcome across gender primed treatments

No Communication(P)
Communication (PC)

Female
Landowner
(FM)
44.33%
(0.498)
71.67%
(0.451)
0.0000 ***

Male
Landowner
(MM)
57.33%
(0.495)
85.00%
(0.358)
0.0000***

𝐻𝐻0 = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
= 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 (𝑝𝑝
− 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)
0.0014***
0.0001***

𝐻𝐻0 = 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝑝𝑝
− 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣)
Significance levels: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Standard Deviation in parentheses
Our conservation outcome hypotheses predicted that male tenants would choose not to
conserve, more for male landowners compared to female landowners, for a specific
contract type. Without looking at choice of contracts offered, Table 2.11 indicates that
male tenants choose significantly higher proportion of conservation outcome for
male landowners (57.33% and 85% in MMP and MMPC treatments respectively)
compared to female landowners (44.33% and 71.67% for FMP and FMPC
treatments respectively), partially confirming our hypothesis. This difference persists
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and is significant when communication is allowed. Although with communication there
is significantly higher conservation outcomes for both male and female landowners.
Next, we look specifically at contract choices where we had expected gendered
interactions to arise. In these contracts male tenants would earn the same payoffs from
choosing C and DC while the landowner earns an additional payoff benefit when the
tenant chooses C.
This happens in two ways in our payoff environment:
1) when tenants are offered a fixed rent with penalty contract- the tenant earns 100 points
regardless of C or DC while landowner earns 225 points when the tenant chooses C and
100 points if the tenant chooses DC.
2) when tenants are offered a fixed rent with discount and discount is 50 points. The
tenant earns 150 points regardless of choice C or DC while landowner earns 175 points
from C and 100 points from DC.
We inspect if there are any gendered responses to these offers. For example, if tenants
choose DC when offered a penalty by a female landowner and C when offered a penalty
by a male landowner, we could conclude that there is gendered response on the part of
the tenant.
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Table 2.13 Tenant’s choice of conservation in potentially gendered payoff environments
Choice of C
with Penalty
Female Landowner(FMP)
Male Landowner (MMP)

30.56%
32.43%
Pearson chi2(1) =
0.1438
p-value = 0.705

Choice of C
with Discount (50
points)
70%
64.00%
Pearson chi2(1) =
0.5065
p-value = 0.477

Female Landowner(FMPC)
Male Landowner (MMPC)

35.29%
48.39%
Pearson chi2(1) =
2.2894
p-value= 0.130

71.43%
68.57%
Pearson chi2(1) =
0.1014
p-value = 0.750

Table 2.13 summarizes these results. Although we find that across all treatments male
tenants choose conservation more for male landowners than female landowners in the
potentially gendered payoff environments highlighted above. However, the differences
are not statistically significant. Therefore, we cannot conclude that male tenants
respond differently to male landowners and female landowners for the same
contract type.
However, there is a gendered difference in conservation outcomes as indicated by table
2.12. Clearly male tenants are choosing to conserve more for male landowners than
female landowners. We investigate what contributes to this gendered difference using a
random effects logit regression model with standard errors clustered at the subject level.
This specification is labeled 1 in table 2.14.
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Table 2.14 Logit coefficient estimates predicting tenant’s choice to conserve

Female Landowner
Communication Treatment
Fixed Rent with Penalty
Fixed Rent with Discount
Round
Female*Communication
Female*Penalty
Female*Discount
Lag choice of DC
Discount offsets cost

(1)
Tenant’s choice to
conserve
Logit Coeff
0.124
(0.646)
1.388***
(0.457)
0.800
(0.675)
2.342***
(0.491)
0.0736***
(0.0191)
-0.210
(0.593)
-0.705
(0.764)
-1.066*
(0.579)
0.0988
(0.223)

Discounts overcompensates cost
Female* offset
Female* overcompensate
Negotiation Score
Hostile Sexism Score
Benevolent Sexism Score
Tenant's Adversary Perception
Constant
Observations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

0.00452
(0.00667)
-0.184
(0.124)
-0.143
(0.124)
-1.410***
(0.326)
-0.725
(0.613)
1120

(2)
Tenant’s choice to
conserve with Discount
Logit Coeff
-1.073**
(0.502)
1.599***
(0.449)

0.0821**
(0.0258)
-0.639
(0.585)

-0.156
(0.284)
0.635
(0.493)
1.758***
(0.502)
1.131
(0.693)
1.019
(0.688)
0.00196
(0.00602)
-0.274**
(0.115)
-0.230
(0.157)
-1.001***
(0.363)
0.597
(0.607)
759
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Our dependent variable is the tenant’s choice to conserve where (conserve =1 if tenant
chooses C and conserve =0 otherwise). For specification 1, our explanatory variables
includes a dummy for the female landowner (1 = landowner is female and 0 otherwise), a
dummy variable for communication treatments ( 1 = treatments FMPC and MMPC and 0
= treatments FMP and MMP), a categorical dummy for contract offered by landowner (
1= fixed rent with penalty, 2= fixed rent and 3= fixed rent with discount, with fixed rent
as our base category). From here onwards we refer to these contracts as penalty,
discount, and fixed rent respectively.
We include round as an explanatory variable to capture if the passage of time increases
the likelihood of conservation choices. We include the tenant’s lag choice of DC as
another explanatory variable. Since tenant’s action choice is binary, note that the
counterpart of lag choice of DC is lag choice of C. We interact the female landowner
with communication to understand if female landowners when allowed to communicate
increases the likelihood of conservation choices for the tenant. We also interact female
landowner with contract choice to see if female landowners offering a specific type of
contract increases or decreases the likelihood of conservation choices. Finally, we also
account for the tenant’s gender stereotyping tendencies by including the explicit
tendencies through the negotiation score and implicit tendencies by looking at the hostile
sexism score (HSS) and benevolent sexism scores(BSS) as contributing factors to a
tenant’s choice to conserve.
Our first specification predicts that the gender of the landowner or the contract choices
female landowners make are not contributing factors for the tenants choosing C. We find
that tenants are more likely to choose C when they are communicating with their
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landowners. They are also more likely to choose to conserve when offered a discount and
more likely to choose conserve over time in the decision task. However, if the tenant
perceives the landowner as an adversary, they are less likely to choose to conserve.

Specification 2 examines the tenant’s choice to conserve specifically for discount
contracts, where we keep all explanatory variables from specification 1 except the
contract choice variables as we focus only on the discount contract. We add an additional
categorical variable that divides the type of discounts into three different categories: 1)
discount undercompensates conservation costs (10-40 points), 2) discount offsets
conservation costs (50 points) 3) discount overcompensates conservation costs. We
assign category 1 as the base category and here onwards call the categories as
undercompensate, offset, and overcompensate respectively. We also interact female
landowner with these discount categories to examine if female landowners offering a
particular type of discount is more likely to increase conservation for the tenants.
Results indicate that female dummy is significant, therefore tenants are marginally less
likely to choose to conserve when offered a discount contract by a female landowner.
Although the interactions with female and type of discount offered does not give us any
significant results. Both communication and round variable positively impact the tenant’s
conservation choice in a discount contract. A tenant is also significantly more likely to
choose to conserve when the discount overcompensates the cost of conservation- i.e.,
when discounts lie in the range of 60-100 points. While tenant’s perception of landowner
as an adversary continues in this specification to make him significantly less likely to
choose to conserve, we also find that one additional unit of hostile sexism (towards
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women) score would also make the tenant less likely to choose to conserve. This
finding alludes to our hypothesis that there is a gendered behavioral response of male
tenants and their decision to conserve.
Landowner Behavior
Table 2.15 Landowner’s choice of contracts in treatments without communication
Treatments
without
communication
Female
Landowners in
FMP

Fixed Rent

Penalty

Discount

12.67%

36.00%

51.33%

Male
landowners in
MMP

6.67%

24.67%

68.67%

Difference

6%

11.33%

-17.34%

Pearson chi2(2) = 38.8979 p-value= 0.000***
Significance levels: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

Table 2.16 Landowner’s choice of contracts in treatments with communication
Treatments with
communication
Female Landowners
in FMPC
Male landowners in
MMPC
Difference

Fixed Rent

Penalty

Discount

17.33%

11.33%

71.33%

6.67%

10.33%

83.67%

11.33%

1%

-12.34%

Pearson chi2(2) = 39.1937 p-value = 0.000***
Significance levels: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

Having examined the tenant’s conservation choice now we turn to landowners and their
contract choices. From table 2.15 and 2.16 above, we find that female landowners offer
more fixed rent contracts than male landowners across all treatments (with and without
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communication). Female landowners also offer significantly fewer discounts than male
landowners across all treatments. When communication is not allowed then female
landowners offer more penalty contracts compared to male landowners. With
communication there is a very small difference in choice of penalty contracts between
male and female landowners.
Table 2.17 Multinomial Logit coefficients predicting landowner’s contract choice

Round
Female Landowner
Communication Treatment
Lag choice of contract is same as
present choice of contract(CL)
Lag choice of DC
Female*Communication
Female*Lag choice of DC
Female*CL
Negotiation Score
Hostile Sexism Score
Benevolent Sexism Score
Landowner’s Adversary Perception
Constant
Observations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Multinomial Logit Coeff
for Penalty

Multinomial Logit Coeff
for Discount

0.0340
(0.0307)
0.419
(0.628)
-0.282
(0.651)

0.0641**
(0.0253)
0.167
(0.681)
0.0266
(0.498)

2.716**
(1.091)

4.311***
(1.005)

1.510***
(0.449)
-0.850
(0.818)
-0.518
(0.614)
-2.130*
(1.212)
-0.000687
(0.00606)
-0.00751
(0.154)
0.0264
(0.212)
0.538
(0.462)
-0.971
(0.679)

0.685
(0.467)
-0.574
(0.767)
-0.662
(0.592)
-2.920**
(1.123)
0.0101*
(0.00596)
0.120
(0.143)
0.0460
(0.207)
-1.206**
(0.543)
0.590
(0.619)

1120
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Our treatment wise descriptive statistics indicate that our hypotheses that female
landowners will offer more discount contracts than male landowners; and fewer
penalty contracts compared to male landowners does not bear out. We therefore
examine factors contributing to the landowner’s contract choice. We run a random effects
multinomial logit regression on the landowner’s contract choices, with errors clustered at
the subject level. Contract choice is a categorical variable (1 = Penalty, 2= Fixed Rent
and 3 = Discount). We use Fixed Rent as the base category. All coefficients reported
therefore report likelihood of contract choice in comparison to Fixed Rent. Our
independent variables include a dummy for female landowner, round, dummy for
communication treatment, a dummy variable to capture if the lag choice of contract is the
same as the present period contract choice to pick up any strategic inertia the landowner
experienced and the tenant’s lag choice of DC. We interact the female landowner dummy
with communication treatment, to see if communication increases the likelihood of
female landowners offering a certain type of contract. We also interact female landowner
with the tenant’s lag choice of DC to understand if female landowners were more likely
to pick a certain contract if their tenant chose not to conserve in the previous round. The
interaction term for female landowner and strategic inertia(CL) is meant to capture if
female landowners are more likely to choose a contract because they offered the same
contract in the previous round.

The main factors impacting the choice of penalty contracts indicate that the landowner is
more likely to offer a penalty if he/she offered a penalty in the previous round. The tenant
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choosing not to conserve in the previous round would also make it more likely that the
landowner chooses a penalty. At 10% level of significance, we find that the coefficient of
interaction term Female* CL is negative. This indicates female landowners are less
likely to offer a penalty if she offered a penalty in the previous round. Recall that the
base category is the Fixed Rent contract indicating that compared to a Fixed Rent
contract, the female landowner is less likely to offer a penalty when she offered a penalty
in the previous period. We find a similar result when we look at landowner’s choice of
discount contract. We find that female landowners are less likely to choose a discount
contract if she selected it in the previous round. This is likely because she is offering
lower discounts. As our model predicts a landowner is indifferent between a fixed rent
contract and fixed rent with discount contract when the discount partially offsets
conservation costs (i.e. 𝑑𝑑1 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ). Therefore, female landowners are behaving in
line with model predictions. And they will offer less penalty or discount compared to
fixed rent if they offered the same contract in the previous round. This finding is
suggesting that female landowners tend to fall back on fixed rent- which descriptive
statistics also indicate that they pick more often than male landowners. Recall that when
landowners choose the contract they want to offer- they choose between fixed rent and
fixed rent with discount first. If they choose fixed rent they are then asked if they would
like to impose a penalty worth 50 points on the tenant, where the landowner would have
to choose Yes or No. If landowners choose no that is equivalent to choosing a Fixed Rent
contract. If a female landowner chooses fixed rent after offering a penalty in the previous
round, she may be signaling to her tenant that she will not penalize him anymore. If a
female landowner chooses fixed rent after offering a discount, she may be expecting the
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tenant reciprocate her discount offer from the previous round and choose C so she can
have additional payoff benefits from him choosing C. Behaviorally, these choices may
also indicate that the female landowner is signaling to the male tenant that she is
“average” following the wallflower effect explored by Jones and Linardi (2014).

Round is significant when it comes to choice of discount contracts, indicating that over
time discount is more likely to be chosen. A discount contract is also more likely to be
chosen if it was selected in the past round. We also find that if the landowner perceives
the renter as an adversary, he/she is less likely to offer a discount to the renter. At the
10% level of significance, negotiation score coefficient is significant and positive. One
unit increase in negotiation score implies that the landowner sees women as stronger
negotiators than men. So, landowners who see women as stronger negotiators than men
are more likely to choose discount contracts. This does not say anything about the
gendered interaction with the tenants as such, as all tenants are male. However, it says
something about the landowner’s gender stereotyping tendencies and the contract choice
they make.
Table 2.18 Types of discounts offered by landowners in the no communication treatment
Treatments without
Discount
communication
undercompensates
cost

Discount just
offsets cost

Discount overcompensates
cost

FMP

33.77%

26.49%

39.74%

MMP

20.00%

12.20%

67.80%

Difference

13.77%

14.20%

-28.06%

Pearson chi2(2) = 28.3721 p-value= 0.000***
Significance levels: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10
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Table 2.19 Types of discounts offered by landowners in the communication treatment
Treatments with
communication

Discount just
offsets cost

FMPC

Discount
undercompensates
cost
17.92%

16.51%

Discount overcompensates
cost
65.57%

MMPC

11.52%

8.64%

79.84%

Difference

6.4%

7.87%

-14.27%

Pearson chi2(2) = 12.0431 p-value = 0.002***
Significance levels: *** p <0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10

Now we turn to discount values offered by the landowner. Initial tests with types of
discounts indicate that female landowners offer significantly more discounts that
undercompensate and offsets the conservation costs of the tenant compared to male
landowners. Male landowners on the other hand, offer more discounts than
overcompensate the male tenant compared to female landowners. This trend is observed
across both the communication and no communication treatments. Our hypothesis that
female landowners may offer discounts of higher magnitudes compared to male
landowners does not follow from these initial findings.
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Table 2.20 Tobit coefficients for landowner’s choice of discount values

Female Landowner
Round
Communication Treatment
Female*Communication
Lag choice of DC
Female*Lag choice of DC
Discount in Lag Period(DL)
Female*DL
Negotiation Score
Hostile Sexism Score
Benevolent Sexism Score
Landowner’s Adversary Perception
Constant
Observations
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(1)
Tobit Coeff for Discount Values
offered by Landowners
-12.73*
(6.889)
0.541***
(0.162)
3.274
(5.639)
-0.464
(7.621)
-3.957
(2.570)
-2.785
(3.655)
-6.957**
(2.778)
6.436
(3.954)
-0.0357
(0.0837)
0.304
(1.651)
-5.936**
(1.966)
-5.492
(4.818)
73.51***
(7.231)
772

We run a tobit regression on the discount values offered by landowners, specifying the
upper and lower limits to 100 and 10 respectively. This is because landowners can choose
between discount values 10-100 with discount increasing by 10.Our independent
variables include a dummy for the female landowner, round, dummy for communication,
tenant’s choice of DC in earlier period and dummy variable that captures if Discount
contract was offered in previous period (DL =1 if discount offered, 0 otherwise)). We
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also interact female landowner dummy with the tenant’s lag choice of DC and the
dummy for DL. Gender stereotyping tendencies of the landowner are also included as
explanatory variables.

We find that female dummy is negative at significance level of 10%. The positive
coefficient of round variable indicates that with time higher discount values are offered.
We also find that landowners will offer lower discount when discount contract was
offered in the previous period. The landowner’s benevolent sexism score negatively
affects the discount value. That is, with one additional unit of BSS scores a landowner is
less likely to offer a high discount value. BSS scores indicate the landowner’s
stereotyping tendency where they think highly of the other gender(other gender being
male for female landowners and female for male landowners). The tobit coefficient
suggests such landowners offer lower discounts to the tenants.

Frequency of discount value choice- FMP & MMP
FMP

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

150
100
50
0

frequency of discount value choice

200

MMP

Priming treatments with no communication

Figure 2.5 Discount Value choices in no communication treatments
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Frequency of discount value choice- FMPC & MMPC
FMPC

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

200
100
0

frequency of discount value choice

300

MMPC

Graphs by priming and communication treatments

Figure 2.5 Discount Value choices in communication treatments

Looking at the distribution of discount values offered across treatments reveals how male
and female landowners differ in terms of discount values offered. In both with and
without communication treatments, male landowners behaved more strategically and
offered the discount value 60 the most number of times. This discount value
overcompensates the tenant’s cost conservation by 10 points while allowing the male
landowner to earn 165 points and the male tenant to earn 160 points. Frequency of
discount value 50 points (the discount that just offsets the conservation cost) is higher for
female landowners in treatments without communication compared to discount value 60
points (the popular choice for male landowners). In treatments with communication
however, female landowners catch on and offer discount value of 60 points the most
number of times. This pattern of discount value choice makes us conjecture if male
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landowners were being overly friendly to their male tenants because of their shared
identity (as indicated by the gender icons displayed at every payoff table)- something that
female landowners and male tenants did not have.
2.6. Conclusion
The literature on contract choices that would enable landowners and tenants to
collaboratively plan conservation is growing. Our study contributes to this literature and
examines the role of gender in the choice of incentives and consequent conservation
outcomes. Our study explores how men and women differ in contract choices to
incentivize tenants and how tenants respond to these choices. Our model predicts that in
the presence of identity loss a female landowner would not incentivize conservation by
offering a penalty while a male landowner has the option to do so. Male tenants will
choose to conserve when a male landowner chooses a penalty contract but will not do so
for female landowners.
We find significant differences in how male and female landowners chose to incentivize
the tenant. Using a controlled experiment allows us to clearly test for differences in
contract choices based on the gender of the landowner. We find that contrary to our
predicted hypotheses, female landowners offer fewer discount contracts compared to
male landowners. Moreover, male landowners offer a high frequency of discounts that
overcompensate the tenant’s conservation costs by 10 points, whereas female landowners
offer discount that either partially offset or just offset conservation costs for the tenant.
Looking at lag period choices, we find that female landowners tended to fall back on
offering fixed rent contracts. This behavior may be interpreted as follows- female
landowners offer smaller discounts in previous periods, tenants don’t conserve,
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landowners then offer fixed rents as a result. Another reason why female landowners
could be offering more fixed rent contracts could be that they were signaling to their
tenants that they won’t penalize them or expecting tenants to reciprocate by choosing C
when a fixed rent contract was offered after a discount contract. Male landowners on the
other hand were better at predicting what male tenants are going to do and therefore offer
a more incentive compatible contract to the male tenant. As a result, we find strong
evidence that tenants conservation choices varies with the gender of the landowner. Male
tenants choose higher proportion of conservation for male landowners compared to
female landowners. Our study finds that communication is a significant variable when it
comes to predicting the tenant’s choice of conservation, while it is not significant in
determining the landowner’s choice of contracts and discount values. Therefore, this
study benchmarks that removing the communication gap between the landowner and the
tenant is particularly helpful for the tenant and facilitates higher choice of conservation.
While some of our results are unexpected, they open up some new avenues for further
discussion and study on behavioral differences across genders when it comes to making
contract choices and conservation outcomes. One of the complaints that women NOLs
have in the field, is that they feel like they don’t have a seat at the table. A current
direction that is being taken is engaging women NOLs in learning circle events. Petrzelka
et al.(2020) find that hands on learning, networking with other female landowners and
specific information about conservation helped facilitate conservation outcomes for
women NOLs. Our study provides evidence that even after removing the knowledge gap
issue between landowners and tenants (because our experiment has common knowledge),
an interesting dynamic unfolds with the male- male treatments – where male landowners
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and tenants co-operate with each other, while female landowners struggle with making
choices that work. This behavior echoes what has been observed in the field and our
study shows that it is a gender issue, not just a matter of bridging the knowledge gap. A
clear understanding of how other male landowners are behaving with their male tenants
and case studies that highlight successful implementation of conservation outcomes could
be a helpful strategy going forward. We find that communication with their male tenant,
dissipates some of the uncertainty the female landowners face on what is acceptable to
the male tenant which opens a direction for policymakers to work with.

99

REFERENCES
Akerlof, George and Rachel E. Kranton. 2000. Economics and Identity, Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 115:3, pp. 715–33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2586894
Abel, Martin, 2019. "Do Workers Discriminate against Female Bosses?" IZA Discussion
Papers 12611, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
https://www.iza.org/en/publications/dp/12611/do-workers-discriminate-against-femalebosses
Arnold SH, McAuliffe K., 2021. “Children Show a Gender Gap in Negotiation”
Psychological Science, 32(2): 153-158. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620965544
Ayalew, Shibiru & Manian, Shanthi & Sheth, Ketki, 2021. "Discrimination from below:
Experimental evidence from Ethiopia," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier,
vol. 151(C). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102653
Bigelow, D., A. Borchers, and T. Hubbs. 2016. U.S. Farmland Ownership, Tenure, and
Transfer. Economic Information Bulletin Number 161. Washington, DC: USDA
Economic Research Service.
Babcock, Linda and Laschever, Sara, 2009. Women don’t ask: Negotiation and the
gender divide. Princeton University Press
Babcock, Linda and Recalde, Maria P,Vesterlund, Lise and Weingart, Laurie, 2017.
“Gender differences in accepting and receiving requests for tasks with low
promotability”, American Economic Review, 107(3), 714-47.
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141734

100

Bowles, Hannah Riley and Babcock, Linda and Lai, Lei, 2007. “Social Incentives for
gender differences in the propensity to initiate negotiations: Sometimes it does hurt to
ask”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 103(1), 84-103.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2006.09.001
Chakraborty, Priyanka & Serra,Danila (2021). "Gender and leadership in organizations:
Promotions, demotions and angry workers," Working Papers 20210104-001, Texas A&M
University, Department of Economics.
Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin & Wickens, Chris, 2016. "oTree—An open-source
platform for laboratory, online, and field experiments," Journal of Behavioral and
Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(C), pages 88-97.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001
Cox, E. (2010). The Landowner’ s Guide to Sustainable Farm Leasing Part of the
Agriculture Commons, and the Agriculture Law Commons.
Eckel, C., & Grossman, P. (2001). Chivalry and solidarity in ultimatum games. Economic
Inquiry, 39(2), 171–188. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00059.x
Gangadharan, Lata & Jain, Tarun & Maitra, Pushkar & Vecci, Joseph, 2016. "Social
identity and governance: The behavioral response to female leaders," European
Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 302-325.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.003
Grossman, P. J., Eckel, C., Komai, M., & Zhan, W. (2019). It pays to be a man: Rewards
for leaders in a coordination game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 161,
197–215. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.04.002

101

Li, Yaxiong & Sbai, Erwann & Chaudhuri, Ananish, 2021. "An experimental study of
gender differences in agency relationships," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental
Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101650
Jones D, Linardi S. Wallflowers: Experimental evidence of an aversion to standing out.
Management Science. 2014 Mar 10; 60(7):1757–71. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42919632
Masuda, Y.J.,Harden, SC., Ranjan, P. , Wardropper, C.B. , Weigel, C. , Ferraro, P.J. ,
Reddy, S.M.W. , & Prokopy, L.S. (2021) Rented farmland: A missing piece of the
nutrient management puzzle in the Upper Mississippi River Basin? Journal of Soil and
Water Conservation 76(1):5A-9A. https://doi. org/10.2489/jswc.2021.1109A.
Murad Z, Stavropoulou C, Cookson G (2019) Incentives and gender in a multi-task
setting: An experimental study with real-effort tasks. PLoS ONE 14(3): e0213080.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0213080
Niederle, M. and L. Vesterlund, 2007. “Do women shy away from competition? Do men
compete too much?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 10671101. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067
Petrzelka, P. , Barnett, M.J., Roesch-McNally, G., & Filipiak J. (2021). Advancing
understanding of conservation practices on rented land. Journal of Soil and Water
Conservation , 76 (2) 35A-40A; DOI: https://doi.org/10.2489/jswc.2021.0209A
Petrzelka, P. , Ott, M.B., Fairchild, E., Fillipiak, J. (2020). ‘From a circle of
introductions’: adult learning and empowerment of women agricultural landowners.

102

Environmental Education Research. 26:2, 206-218. DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1080/13504622.2019.1632265
Ranjan, P., Wardropper, C. B., Eanes, F. R., Reddy, S. M. W., Harden, S. C., Masuda, Y.
J., & Prokopy, L. S. (2019). Understanding barriers and opportunities for adoption of
conservation practices on rented farmland in the US. Land Use Policy, 80, 214–223.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.09.039
Sawadgo, W., Zhang, W., & Plastina, A. (2021). What drives landowners’ conservation
decisions? Evidence from Iowa. Journal of Soil and Water Conservation, 76(3) 211-221;
https://doi.org/10.2489/jswc.2021.00115
Weigel C., .,Harden, SC., Masuda, Y.J, Ranjan, P., Wardropper, C.B., Ferraro, P.J.,
Prokopy, L.S., Reddy, S.M.W. (2021). Using a randomized controlled trial to develop
conservation strategies on rented farmlands. Conservation Letters, 14 (4) e12803 ;
https://doi.org/10.1111/conl.12803
USDA NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service). 2015. Farmland Ownership and
Tenure. Results from the 2014 Tenure, Ownership and Transition of Agricultural Land
Survey. Washington, DC: USDA NASS.

103

APPENDIX
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Female-Male Prime and Communication Treatment
General Instructions
Welcome! This is an experiment in economic decision making.
At the end of the experiment you will receive an Amazon gift card equivalent to your
earnings in this study. Please read the instructions carefully, as they will help you
succeed today.
Your payment in this experiment depends on your choices and the choices of one other
participant.
In addition to your earnings from the experiment you will also be paid a participation fee
of USD $5 (this amount will also be included on the Amazon gift card). During the
experiment, all earnings will be recorded in points.
At the end of the experiment, the points will be converted to U.S dollars at the rate
of $1 for every 211 points.
There are Three parts to this experiment.
In Part 1, you will read and reflect on a passage presented to you and answer some
questions
In Part 2, you will participate in a decision task with another person.
In Part 3,you will complete a short survey.
Your earnings from this experiment will depend upon your choices in Part 2 only.
Please click on the 'Next' button to continue to Part 1
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Description of the Decision Task- Owner’s View
In this part of the experiment, you will be part of a Decision Task. You are the OWNER.
This task involves renting an asset to the Renter. You will be making this renting
decision multiple times in multiple rounds. You will choose between three types of
rental contracts (described below) to offer the Renter. Once you have offered a contract
to the Renter, he will choose one of two actions – Action D or Action G. His choice of
action will determine your rental payoff.
How you will make decisions
1. During each round in the Decision Task, you will first chat with the Renter.
2. You will then choose one of the three rental contracts to offer the Renter
3. After you have made your choice, the Renter will be informed about your choice
and will make his action choice.
4. Once both of you have made your choices, payoffs will be determined and
announced to both of you and the next round will begin.
5. The number of rounds in which you will make choices will not be known to you
in advance. Remember that like you, the Renter has access to all the same payoff
tables when making his choices.
6. You will interact with the SAME Renter for all rounds of the Decision Task.

Rental Contracts and Earnings
You can rent the asset to the Renter via one of three types of rental contracts (described
below). For each contract type, the Renter will pay you rent. This rent and any
additional benefits of the Renter’s chosen action will determine your payoff from the
Decision Task.
Note: When the Renter chooses Action G, you receive the rental income only. When
the Renter chooses Action D you receive an additional payoff over and above the rent
you receive. For the Renter, Action D is costlier to implement than Action G. The
Renter knows that Action D generates an additional payoff for you over and above the
rent he pays you. Also, the Renter is aware that you know it is costlier for him to choose
Action D than Action G.

Rental Contracts:
As noted, you can offer one of three types of rental contract to the Renter.
1. Option 1: Fixed Rent without Penalty: you rent the asset at a fixed rental
value. If the Renter chooses Action D, you get an additional payoff on top of the
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rent you receive. If the Renter chooses Action G, you do not get an additional
payoff. Your payoffs are as follows:
If Renter Chooses Action D:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid
2. Option 2 Fixed Rent with Penalty: if you choose this option you receive the
same payoff as in Option 1. But now you have the option to impose an upfront
penalty on the Renter (at no additional expense to you). Imposing an upfront
penalty on the Renter will lower the renter’s payoff from choosing Action G
instead of Action D. You may choose to impose this upfront penalty, if you think
that the Renter will choose Action G (the action that generates no additional
payoff benefits for you). If you choose to impose a penalty, this information will
be conveyed to the Renter after which he will make his Action choice.
If Renter Chooses Action D:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid
3. Option 3 Fixed Rent with Discount: Under this option the fixed rental value is
the same as Option 1 but now you have the option to provide an upfront rental
discount to the Renter (at an additional expense to you). Providing this upfront
rental discount will increase the Renter’s payoff from choosing Action D (the
action that generates an additional payoff to you). You may choose to provide this
upfront rental discount to encourage the Renter to choose Action D. Once you
choose this rental contract option, this information will be conveyed to the Renter
after which the Renter will make his Action choice.
If Renter Chooses Action D:
Discount

Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D – Rental
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid
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Communication between rounds of the Decision Task
At the beginning of every round of the Decision Task before you and the Renter make a
choice, you will be able to communicate with the Renter through an on-screen chat
window about all aspects of today’s experiment.
We only ask that you follow two rules 1) Please only use your ID to identify yourself;
and 2) Do not use profanities.
Only you and the Renter will be able to view these messages. You will be able to
communicate for 1 minute and 30 seconds in each round before the chat windows
disappear automatically.

Information you receive after you make a decision
After you and the Renter have made your decisions, the following information will be
provided to you:
•
•
•
•
•

Rental contract you offered
Rental Discount offered by you if you offered the Fixed Rent with Discount
The Renter’s action choice
Your payoff for the current round (the Renter sees his current payoff, but this
information is not available to you and vice versa)
Your cumulative payoffs for all completed rounds (the Renter sees his cumulative
payoffs but this information is not available to you and vice versa)

How to Read the Payoff Tables:
The tables on your screen present examples of payoff tables you will see in the Decision
Task. They represent your and the Renter’s payoffs under Fixed Rent contract with or
without Penalty (Table 1) and Fixed Rent with Discount contract (Table 2). Each
number in the table corresponds to a payoff in points. Your choices and
corresponding payoffs are given in purple. The Renter’s choices and payoffs are given
in green.
As you can see, both your and the Renter’s choices affect each other. You will always
have access to the payoff tables when you are making decisions. For the current
example, the value of the discount ranges between 1 and 10 points and the penalty
value is 5 points.
For both the payoff tables, the row numbers are included for your convenience and will
not be included in the actual payoff tables when you make your decisions. Row 1 and
Row 2 show your payoffs for each action under a rental contract option. We have
included an icon to the left of the table in the first column to help you understand which
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of the numbers refer to your payoffs. Of these two rows, Row 1 shows what you earn
when the Renter chooses Action D given your rental contract choice. Row 2 shows what
you earn when the Renter chooses Action G for your rental contract choice.
Rows 3 and 4 show the Renter’s payoffs for each action given your contract choice.
Row 3 shows the Renter’s payoffs when he chooses Action D and Row 4 shows his
payoffs when he chooses Action G for each rental contract type.
Please remember
•
•
•

For each rental option you choose your payoffs from the round will depend on the
action that is chosen by the Renter.
Your payoffs corresponding to Action G under Option 2 includes the 5-point
penalty that has been deducted. No penalty is deducted from the Renter’s payoff if
he chooses Action D although you chose the option to impose a penalty on him.
Your payoffs corresponding to Action D under Option 3 include the discount that
has been deducted from your payoff and added to the Renter’s payoff. No
discount is deducted from your payoff if the Renter chooses Action G although
you chose the option to offer a discount.

Note, that the payoff numbers in the tables represent the final payoffs from each
contract and action choice. No further calculations are required on your part.

Row 1
What you
Earn

Row 2

Row 3
What the
Renter earns

Row 4

Renter
Chooses
Action D
Renter
Chooses
Action G
Renter
Chooses
Action D
Renter
Chooses
Action G
Table 1

Option 1
Fixed Rent
without
Penalty

Option 2
Fixed Rent
with
Penalty

21

21

10

10

10

10

15

10
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For example, in Table 1, if you choose Option 1 and the Renter chooses Action D you
earn 21 points while the Renter earns 10 points. If the Renter selects Action G, you earn
10 points and the Renter earns 15 points.
In Table 1, if you offer Option 2 and the Renter chooses Action D, the 5-point penalty is
not imposed, you earn 21 points, and the Renter earns 10 points. If the Renter chooses
Action G, the 5-point penalty is imposed, and you earn 10 points and the Renter earns 10
points.
Option 3
Discounted
Rent

Discount
Values
Row
1

What you
Earn

Row
2
Row
3

What the
Renter earns

Row
4

Renter
Chooses
Action
D
Renter
Chooses
Action
G
Renter
Chooses
Action
D
Renter
Chooses
Action
G

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

Table 2

Again, in Table 2, if you choose Option 3 and offer a discount of 1 point, you earn 20
points when Renter chooses Action D while the Renter earns 11 points. If Renter chooses
Action G, you earn 10 points while the Renter earns 15 points.
Once you review this information, please return to the experiment interface and click on
the “Proceed to Quiz” button. The quiz checks your understanding of the experiment.
After the quiz, there will be a practice stage where you will make decisions in the
experiment with the Renter for 2 rounds. Your choices in the quiz and practice rounds
will not influence your experimental earnings in any way. After finishing the practice
rounds, you will begin the experiment.
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Summary of Instructions
1. You are the Owner
2. You will be renting out an asset to the Renter. You will interact with the same
renter for all rounds.
3.

The Renter can choose one of two actions- Action D or Action G. Action D is
costlier to implement than Action G. You make an additional payoff on top of
your rental income if the Renter chooses Action D.

4. You can offer a contract that is:
-

Option 1: Fixed Rent.

-

Option 2: Fixed Rent with an upfront penalty which is imposed on the
Renter if he chooses Action G and not Action D.

-

Option 3: Fixed Rent with a discount offered to the Renter for choosing
Action D. If you offer a discount and Renter chooses Action D, then the
discount is deducted from your rental payoff and added to the Renter’s payoff
for this round.

5. When the Renter chooses between Action D and Action G, he knows which rental
contract you have offered him including any penalty or discount.
6. All payoff tables are always available to you and the Renter when each of you
make your decisions in a round.
7. The payoff tables show final payoffs.
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Description of the Decision Task- Renter’s View
In this part of the experiment, you will be part of a Decision Task. You are the
RENTER. This task involves renting an asset from the Owner. You will be making this
renting decision multiple times in multiple rounds. The Owner will choose between
three types of rental contracts (described below) to offer you. Once you have been
offered a contract by the Owner, you will choose one of two actions- Action D or
Action G. Your choice of action will determine the output you produce using the asset,
and therefore your net payoff.
How you will make decisions
7. During each round in the Decision Task, you will first chat with the Owner.
8. The Owner will then choose one of the three rental contracts to offer you.
9. After she has made her choice, you will be informed about her choice and you
will make your action choice.
10. Once both of you have made your choices, payoffs will be determined and
announced to both of you and the next round will begin.
11. The number of rounds in which you will make choices will not be known to you
in advance. Remember that like you, the Owner has access to all the same payoff
tables when making her choices.
12. You will interact with the SAME Owner for all rounds of the Decision Task.

Rental Contracts and Earnings
The Owner can rent the asset to you via one of three types of rental contracts
(described below). For each contract type, you will pay rent. This rent and the costs of
implementing your chosen action will be deducted from the output you will produce
to determine your payoff from the Decision Task.
Note: Action D generates higher output for you but is costlier to implement than
Action G. Action D generates an additional payoff for the asset Owner over and
above the rent you pay her. Also, whenever she is making a rental contract choice, she
knows that it is costlier for you to choose Action D than Action G.
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Rental Contracts:
As noted, the Owner can offer one of three types of rental contract to you.
1.Under Option 1 termed Fixed Rent without Penalty, she rents the asset to you at a
fixed rental value. If you choose Action D, the Owner gets an additional payoff on top
of the rent you pay her. If you choose Action G, the Owner does not get an additional
payoff. Your payoffs are as follows.
If you choose Action D:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent
Paid
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid
2.Under Option 2 termed Fixed Rent with Penalty, the fixed rental payoff for the
Owner is same as in Option 1. But now she has the option to impose an upfront penalty
on you (at no additional expense to her). Imposing an upfront penalty will lower your
payoff from choosing Action G instead of Action D. She may choose to impose this
upfront penalty, if she thinks that you will choose Action G (the action that generates no
additional payoff benefits for her). If the Owner chooses to impose a penalty, this
information will be conveyed to you after which you will make your Action choice.
If you choose Action D:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent Paid
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid
- Penalty
3. Under Option 3 termed Fixed Rent with Discount, the fixed rental value is same as
Option 1 but now she has the option to provide an upfront rental discount to you (at an
additional expense to her). Providing this upfront rental discount will increase your
payoff from choosing Action D (the action that generates an additional payoff to the
Owner). She may choose to provide this upfront rental discount to encourage you to
choose Action D. Once the Owner chooses this rental contract option, this information
will be conveyed to you after which you will make your Action choice.
If you choose Action D:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent Paid
+ Rental Discount
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid
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Communication between rounds of the Decision Task
At the beginning of every round of the Decision Task before you and the Owner make a
choice, you will be able to communicate with the Owner through an on-screen chat
window, about all aspects of today’s experiment.
We only ask that you follow two rules 1) Please only use your ID to identify yourself; 2)
Do not use profanities.
Only you and the Owner will be able to view these messages. You will be able to
communicate for 1 minute and 30 seconds in each round before the chat windows
disappear automatically.

Information you receive after you make a decision
After you and the Owner have made your decisions, the following information will be
provided to you:
•
•
•
•
•

Rental contract offered to you
Rental Discount offered if the Fixed Rent with Discount contract was offered
Your action choice
Your payoff for the current round (the Owner sees her current payoff but this
information is not available to you and vice versa)
Your cumulative payoffs for all completed rounds (the Owner sees her cumulative
payoffs but this information is not available to you and vice versa).

How to Read the Payoff Tables:
The tables on your screen present examples of payoff tables you will see in the
Decision Task. They represent your and the Owner’s payoffs under Fixed Rent contract
with or without Penalty (Table 1) and Fixed Rent with Discount contract (Table 2).
Each number in the table corresponds to a payoff in points. Your choices and
corresponding payoffs are given in green. The Owner’s choices and payoffs are given
in purple.
As you can see, both your and the Owner’s choices affect each other. You will always
have access to the payoff tables when you are making decisions. For the current
example, the value of the discount ranges between 1 and 10 points and the penalty
value is 5 points.
For both the payoff tables, the row numbers are included for your convenience and will
not be included in the actual payoff tables when you make your decisions. Row 1 and
Row 2 show your payoffs for each action under a rental contract option. We have
included an icon to the left of the table in the first column to help you understand which
numbers refer to your payoffs. Of these two rows, Row 1 shows what you earn when you
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choose Action D given the Owner’s rental contract choice. Row 2 shows what you earn
when you choose Action G for the Owner’s rental contract choice.
Rows 3 and 4 show the Owner’s payoffs for each contract given your action choice.
Row 3 shows the Owner’s payoffs when you choose Action D and Row 4 shows her
payoffs when you choose Action G for each rental contract type.
Please remember
•
•
•

For each rental option you are offered by the Owner, your payoffs from the round
will depend on the action that you choose.
Your payoffs for Action G under Option 2 includes the 5-point penalty that has
been deducted. No penalty is deducted from your payoff if you choose Action D
although the Owner chose the option to impose a penalty on you.
Your payoffs for Action D under Option 3 include the discount that has been
added to your payoff and deducted from the Owner’s payoff. No discount is
added to your payoff if you choose Action G although the Owner chose the option
to offer you a discount.

Note that the payoff numbers in the tables represent the final payoffs from each
contract and action choice. No further calculations are required on your part.

Row 1

What You
Earn:

Row 2

Row 3
What the
Owner Earns

Row 4

You Choose
Action D

You Choose
Action G
You Choose
Action D
You Choose
Action G
Table 3

Option 1
Fixed Rent
without
Penalty

Option 2
Fixed Rent
with
Penalty

10

10

15

10

21

21

10

10
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For example, in Table 1, if you are offered Option 1 and you choose Action D you earn
10 points while the Owner earns 21 points. If you select Action G, you earn 15 points,
and the Owner earns 10 points.
Again, in Table 1, if you are offered Option 2 and you choose Action D, the 5-point
penalty is not imposed, and you earn 10 points while the Owner earns 21 points. If you
select Action G, the 5- point penalty is imposed and you earn 15 points, and the Owner
earns 10 points.

Option 3
Fixed Rent
with Discount

Discount
Values

Row
1
What You
Earn

Row
2

Row
3

What the
Owner Earns

Row
4

You
Choose
Action
D
You
Choose
Action
G
You
Choose
Action
D
You
Choose
Action
G

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11

10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
Table 4

Again, in Table 2, if you are offered Option 3 and a discount of 1 point, you earn 11
points when you choose Action D and the Owner earns 20 points. If you choose Action
G, you earn 15 points while the Owner earns 10 points.

Once you review this information, please return to the experiment interface and click on
“Proceed to Quiz” button. The quiz checks your understanding of the experiment. After
the quiz, there will be a practice stage where you will make decisions in the experiment
with the Owner for 2 rounds. Your choices in the quiz and practice rounds will not
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influence your experimental earnings in any way. After finishing the practice rounds, you
will begin the experiment.

Summary of Instructions
1. You are the Renter
2. You will be renting an asset from the Owner. You will interact with the same
owner for all rounds.
3. You can choose one of two actions-Action D or Action G. Action D is costlier to
implement than Action G. The Owner makes an additional payoff on top of her
rental income if you choose Action D.
4. The Owner can offer a contract that is :
-

Option 1: Fixed Rent

-

Option 2: Fixed Rent with an upfront penalty which is imposed on you if
you choose Action G and not Action D.

-

Option 3:Fixed Rent with a discount offered to the you for choosing Action
D. If the Owner offers a discount and you choose Action D, then the discount
is added to your payoff and deducted from the Owner’s rental payoff for this
round.

5. When you make a choice between Action D and Action G, you know which rental
contract the Owner has offered you, including any penalty or discount.
6. All payoff tables are always available to you and the Owner when each of you
make your decisions in a round.
7. The payoff tables show final payoffs.
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EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
Baseline/ Control Treatment
General Instructions
Welcome! This is an experiment in economic decision making.
At the end of the experiment you will receive an Amazon gift card equivalent to your
earnings in this study. Please read the instructions carefully, as they will help you
succeed today.
Your payment in this experiment depends on your choices and the choices of one other
participant.
In addition to your earnings from the experiment you will also be paid a participation fee
of USD $5 (this amount will also be included on the Amazon gift card). During the
experiment, all earnings will be recorded in points.
At the end of the experiment, the points will be converted to U.S dollars at the rate
of $1 for every 211 points.
There are Two parts to this experiment.
In Part 1, , you will participate in a decision task with another person.
In Part 2,you will complete a short survey.
Your earnings from this experiment will depend upon your choices in Part 1 only.
Please click on the 'Next' button to continue to Part 1
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Description of the Decision Task – Owner’s View
In this part of the experiment, you will be part of a Decision Task. You are the OWNER.
This task involves renting an asset to the Renter. You will be making this renting
decision multiple times in multiple rounds. You will choose between three types of
rental contracts (described below) to offer the Renter. Once you have offered a contract
to the Renter, they will choose one of two actions – Action D or Action G. The Renter’s
choice of action will determine your rental payoff.
How you will make decisions
13. You will choose one of the three rental contracts to offer the Renter
14. After you have made your choice, the Renter will be informed about your choice
and will make an action choice.
15. Once both of you have made your choices, payoffs will be determined and
announced to both of you and the next round will begin.
16. The number of rounds in which you will make choices will not be known to you
in advance. Remember that like you, the Renter has access to all the same payoff
tables when making choices.
17. You will interact with the SAME Renter for all rounds of the Decision Task.

Rental Contracts and Earnings
You can rent the asset to the Renter via one of three types of rental contracts (described
below). For each contract type, the Renter will pay you rent. This rent and any
additional benefits of the Renter’s chosen action will determine your payoff from the
Decision Task.
Note: When the Renter chooses Action G, you receive the rental income only. When
the Renter chooses Action D you receive an additional payoff over and above the rent
you receive. For the Renter, Action D is costlier to implement than Action G. The
Renter knows that Action D generates an additional payoff for you over and above the
rent they pay you. Also, the Renter is aware that you know it is costlier for them to
choose Action D than Action G.

Rental Contracts:

As noted, you can offer one of three types of rental contract to the Renter.
4. Option 1: Fixed Rent without Penalty: you rent the asset at a fixed rental
value. If the Renter chooses Action D, you get an additional payoff on top of the
rent you receive. If the Renter chooses Action G, you do not get an additional
payoff. Your payoffs are as follows:
If Renter Chooses Action D:
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Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid
5. Option 2 Fixed Rent with Penalty: if you choose this option you receive the
same payoff as in Option 1. But now you have the option to impose an upfront
penalty on the Renter (at no additional expense to you). Imposing an upfront
penalty on the Renter will lower the renter’s payoff from choosing Action G
instead of Action D. You may choose to impose this upfront penalty, if you think
that the Renter will choose Action G (the action that generates no additional
payoff benefits for you). If you choose to impose a penalty, this information will
be conveyed to the Renter after which they will make an Action choice.
If Renter Chooses Action D:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid
6. Option 3 Fixed Rent with Discount: Under this option the fixed rental value is
the same as Option 1 but now you have the option to provide an upfront rental
discount to the Renter (at an additional expense to you). Providing this upfront
rental discount will increase the Renter’s payoff from choosing Action D (the
action that generates an additional payoff to you). You may choose to provide this
upfront rental discount to encourage the Renter to choose Action D. Once you
choose this rental contract option, this information will be conveyed to the Renter
after which the Renter will make an Action choice.
If Renter Chooses Action D:
Discount

Your Payoff = Rent Paid + Additional Payoff from Action D – Rental
If Renter Chooses Action G:
Your Payoff = Rent Paid

Information you receive after you make a decision
After you and the Renter have made your decisions, the following information will be
provided to you:
•
•
•

Rental contract you offered
Rental Discount offered by you if you offered the Fixed Rent with Discount
The Renter’s action choice
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•
•

Your payoff for the current round (the Renter sees their current payoff, but this
information is not available to you and vice versa)
Your cumulative payoffs for all completed rounds (the Renter sees their
cumulative payoffs but this information is not available to you and vice versa)

How to Read the Payoff Tables:
The tables on your screen present examples of payoff tables you will see in the Decision
Task. They represent your and the Renter’s payoffs under Fixed Rent contract with or
without Penalty (Table 1) and Fixed Rent with Discount contract (Table 2). Each
number in the table corresponds to a payoff in points. Your choices and
corresponding payoffs are given in purple. The Renter’s choices and payoffs are given
in green.
As you can see, both your and the Renter’s choices affect each other. You will always
have access to the payoff tables when you are making decisions. For the current
example, the value of the discount ranges between 1 and 10 points and the penalty
value is 5 points.
For both the payoff tables, the row numbers are included for your convenience and will
not be included in the actual payoff tables when you make your decisions. Row 1 and
Row 2 show your payoffs for each action under a rental contract option. Of these
two rows, Row 1 shows what you earn when the Renter chooses Action D given your
rental contract choice. Row 2 shows what you earn when the Renter chooses Action G for
your rental contract choice.
Rows 3 and 4 show the Renter’s payoffs for each action given your contract choice.
Row 3 shows the Renter’s payoffs when they choose Action D and Row 4 shows the
Renter’s payoffs when they choose Action G for each rental contract type.
Please remember
•
•
•

For each rental option you choose, your payoffs from the round will depend on
the action that is chosen by the Renter.
Your payoffs corresponding to Action G under Option 2 includes the 5-point
penalty that has been deducted. No penalty is deducted from the Renter’s payoff if
they choose Action D although you chose the option to impose a penalty.
Your payoffs corresponding to Action D under Option 3 include the discount that
has been deducted from your payoff and added to the Renter’s payoff. No
discount is deducted from your payoff if the Renter chooses Action G although
you chose the option to offer a discount.

Note, that the payoff numbers in the tables represent the final payoffs from each
contract and action choice. No further calculations are required on your part.
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Row 1
What you
Earn

What the
Renter
earns

Row 2

Row 3
Row 4

Renter
Chooses
Action D
Renter
Chooses
Action G
Renter
Chooses
Action D
Renter
Chooses
Action G
Table 5

Option 1
Fixed Rent
without
Penalty

Option 2
Fixed
Rent with
Penalty

21

21

10

10

10

10

15

10

For example, in Table 1, if you choose Option 1 and the Renter chooses Action D you
earn 21 points while the Renter earns 10 points. If the Renter selects Action G, you earn
10 points, and the Renter earns 15 points.
In Table 1, if you offer Option 2 and the Renter chooses Action D, the 5-point penalty is
not imposed, you earn 21 points, and the Renter earns 10 points. If the Renter chooses
Action G, the 5-point penalty is imposed, and you earn 10 points, and the Renter earns 10
points.
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Option 3
Discounted
Rent

Discount
Values
Row
1

What you
Earn

What the
Renter
earns

Row
2
Row
3
Row
4

Renter
Chooses
Action
D
Renter
Chooses
Action
G
Renter
Chooses
Action
D
Renter
Chooses
Action
G

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

Table 6

Again, in Table 2, if you choose Option 3 and offer a discount of 1 point, you earn 20
points when Renter chooses Action D while the Renter earns 11 points. If Renter chooses
Action G, you earn 10 points while the Renter earns 15 points.
Once you review this information, please return to the experiment interface and click on
the “Proceed to Quiz” button. The quiz checks your understanding of the experiment.
After the quiz, there will be a practice stage where you will make decisions in the
experiment with the Renter for 2 rounds. Your choices in the quiz and practice rounds
will not influence your experimental earnings in any way. After finishing the practice
rounds, you will begin the experiment.

122

Summary of Instructions
1. You are the Owner
2. You will be renting out an asset to the Renter. You will interact with the same
renter for all rounds.
3.

The Renter can choose one of two actions- Action D or Action G. Action D is
costlier to implement than Action G. You make an additional payoff on top of
your rental income if the Renter chooses Action D.

4. You can offer a contract that is:
-

Option 1: Fixed Rent.

-

Option 2: Fixed Rent with an upfront penalty which is imposed on the
Renter if they choose Action G and not Action D.

-

Option 3: Fixed Rent with a discount offered to the Renter for choosing
Action D. If you offer a discount and Renter chooses Action D, then the
discount is deducted from your rental payoff and added to the Renter’s payoff
for this round.

5. When the Renter chooses between Action D and Action G, they know which
rental contract you have offered including any penalty or discount.
6. All payoff tables are always available to you and the Renter when each of you
make your decisions in a round.
7. The payoff tables show final payoffs.
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Description of the Decision Task- Renter’s View
In this part of the experiment, you will be part of a Decision Task. You are the
RENTER. This task involves renting an asset from the Owner. You will be making this
renting decision multiple times in multiple rounds. The Owner will choose between
three types of rental contracts (described below) to offer you. Once you have been
offered a contract by the Owner, you will choose one of two actions- Action D or
Action G. Your choice of action will determine the output you produce using the asset,
and therefore your net payoff.
How you will make decisions
18. The Owner will choose one of the three rental contracts to offer you.
19. After the Owner has made their choice, you will be informed about the choice and
you will make your action choice.
20. Once both of you have made your choices, payoffs will be determined and
announced to both of you and the next round will begin.
21. The number of rounds in which you will make choices will not be known to you
in advance. Remember that like you, the Owner has access to all the same payoff
tables when making choices.
22. You will interact with the SAME Owner for all rounds of the Decision Task.

Rental Contracts and Earnings
The Owner can rent the asset to you via one of three types of rental contracts
(described below). For each contract type, you will pay rent. This rent and the costs of
implementing your chosen action will be deducted from the output you will produce
to determine your payoff from the Decision Task.
Note: Action D generates higher output for you but is costlier to implement than
Action G. Action D generates an additional payoff for the asset Owner over and
above the rent you pay. Also, whenever the Owner is making a rental contract choice,
they knows that it is costlier for you to choose Action D than Action G.

Rental Contracts:
As noted, the Owner can offer one of three types of rental contract to you.
1.Under Option 1 termed Fixed Rent without Penalty, the Owner rents the asset to you
at a fixed rental value. If you choose Action D, the Owner gets an additional payoff on
top of the rent you pay. If you choose Action G, the Owner does not get an additional
payoff. Your payoffs are as follows.
If you choose Action D:
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Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent
Paid
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid
2.Under Option 2 termed Fixed Rent with Penalty, the fixed rental payoff for the
Owner is same as in Option 1. But now the Owner has the option to impose an upfront
penalty on you (at no additional expense to the Owner). Imposing an upfront penalty will
lower your payoff from choosing Action G instead of Action D. The Owner may choose
to impose this upfront penalty, if they think that you will choose Action G (the action that
generates no additional payoff benefits to the Owner). If the Owner chooses to impose a
penalty, this information will be conveyed to you after which you will make your Action
choice.
If you choose Action D:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent Paid
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid
- Penalty
3. Under Option 3 termed Fixed Rent with Discount, the fixed rental value is same as
Option 1 but now the Owner has the option to provide an upfront rental discount to you
(at an additional expense to the Owner). Providing this upfront rental discount will
increase your payoff from choosing Action D (the action that generates an additional
payoff to the Owner). The Owner may choose to provide this upfront rental discount to
encourage you to choose Action D. Once the Owner chooses this rental contract option,
this information will be conveyed to you after which you will make your Action choice.
If you choose Action D:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action D – Rent Paid
+ Rental Discount
If you choose Action G:
Your Payoff = Value of Output Produced – Cost of Implementing Action G – Rent Paid

Information you receive after you make a decision
After you and the Owner have made your decisions, the following information will be
provided to you:
•
•
•

Rental contract offered to you
Rental Discount offered if the Fixed Rent with Discount contract was offered
Your action choice
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•
•

Your payoff for the current round (the Owner sees their current payoff, but this
information is not available to you and vice versa)
Your cumulative payoffs for all completed rounds (the Owner sees their
cumulative payoffs, but this information is not available to you and vice versa).

How to Read the Payoff Tables:
The tables on your screen present examples of payoff tables you will see in the
Decision Task. They represent your and the Owner’s payoffs under Fixed Rent contract
with or without Penalty (Table 1) and Fixed Rent with Discount contract (Table 2).
Each number in the table corresponds to a payoff in points. Your choices and
corresponding payoffs are given in green. The Owner’s choices and payoffs are given
in purple.
As you can see, both your and the Owner’s choices affect each other. You will always
have access to the payoff tables when you are making decisions. For the current
example, the value of the discount ranges between 1 and 10 points and the penalty
value is 5 points.
For both the payoff tables, the row numbers are included for your convenience and will
not be included in the actual payoff tables when you make your decisions. Row 1 and
Row 2 show your payoffs for each action under a rental contract option. Of these
two rows, Row 1 shows what you earn when you choose Action D given the Owner’s
rental contract choice. Row 2 shows what you earn when you choose Action G for the
Owner’s rental contract choice.
Rows 3 and 4 show the Owner’s payoffs for each contract given your action choice.
Row 3 shows the Owner’s payoffs when you choose Action D and Row 4 shows the
Owner’s payoffs when you choose Action G for each rental contract type.
Please remember
•
•
•

For each rental option you are offered by the Owner, your payoffs from the round
will depend on the action that you choose.
Your payoffs for Action G under Option 2 includes the 5-point penalty that has
been deducted. No penalty is deducted from your payoff if you choose Action D
although the Owner chose the option to impose a penalty on you.
Your payoffs for Action D under Option 3 include the discount that has been
added to your payoff and deducted from the Owner’s payoff. No discount is
added to your payoff if you choose Action G although the Owner chose the option
to offer you a discount.

Note that the payoff numbers in the tables represent the final payoffs from each
contract and action choice. No further calculations are required on your part.
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What You
Earn:

What the
Owner Earns

Option 1
Fixed Rent
without
Penalty

Option 2
Fixed Rent
with Penalty

10

10

15

10

21

21

10

10

You Choose
Action D

Row 1

You Choose
Action G

Row 2

You Choose
Action D

Row 3

You Choose
Action G
Table 7

Row 4

For example, in Table 1, if you are offered Option 1 and you choose Action D you earn
10 points while the Owner earns 21 points. If you select Action G, you earn 15 points,
and the Owner earns 10 points.
Again, in Table 1, if you are offered Option 2 and you choose Action D, the 5-point
penalty is not imposed, and you earn 10 points while the Owner earns 21 points. If you
select Action G, the 5- point penalty is imposed and you earn 15 points, and the Owner
earns 10 points.

Option 3
Fixed Rent
with
Discount

What You
Earn

Discount
Values

Row 1

Row 2

You
Choose
Action
D
You
Choose
Action
G

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15

15
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Row 3
What the
Owner
Earns

Row 4

You
Choose
Action
D
You
Choose
Action
G

20

19

18

17

16

15

14

13

12

11

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

Table 8
Again, in Table 2, if you are offered Option 3 and a discount of 1 point, you earn 11
points when you choose Action D and the Owner earns 20 points. If you choose Action
G, you earn 15 points while the Owner earns 10 points.
Once you review this information, please return to the experiment interface and click on
“Proceed to Quiz” button. The quiz checks your understanding of the experiment. After
the quiz, there will be a practice stage where you will make decisions in the experiment
with the Owner for 2 rounds. Your choices in the quiz and practice rounds will not
influence your experimental earnings in any way. After finishing the practice rounds, you
will begin the experiment.
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Summary of Instructions
1. You are the Renter
2. You will be renting an asset from the Owner. You will interact with the same
owner for all rounds.
3. You can choose one of two actions-Action D or Action G. Action D is costlier to
implement than Action G. The Owner makes an additional payoff on top of the
rental income if you choose Action D.
4. The Owner can offer a contract that is :
-

Option 1: Fixed Rent

-

Option 2: Fixed Rent with an upfront penalty which is imposed on you if
you choose Action G and not Action D.

-

Option 3:Fixed Rent with a discount offered to you for choosing Action D.
If the Owner offers a discount and you choose Action D, then the discount is
added to your payoff and deducted from the Owner’s rental payoff for this
round.

5. When you make a choice between Action D and Action G, you know which rental
contract the Owner has offered you, including any penalty or discount.
6. All payoff tables are always available to you and the Owner when each of you
make your decisions in a round.
7. The payoff tables show final payoffs.

